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Tribute
Tribute to Chief Judge
Mary Ellen Barbera
A TEACHER, A LAWYER, AND A JUDGE, BUT ALWAYS A
TEACHER
DONALD B. TOBIN ∗
In this Issue, the Maryland Law Review celebrates and recognizes the
groundbreaking achievements of Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera as she
retires from the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 1 We are honored to have
some of the leading jurists and lawyers in the State discuss Chief Judge
Barbera, as a lawyer, jurist, friend, and mentor.
As the dean of her law school, I am honored to count her as a graduate,
and I note that the judicial excellence award bestowed by the law school is
named in her honor. I have had the privilege of working with the Chief Judge
Barbera 2 during her service on our Board of Visitors, but more importantly,
I have had the honor of working with her on important issues facing the
people of Maryland and the Maryland judiciary.
As you will read in the tributes, Chief Judge Barbera will clearly be
remembered for her sharp legal mind, her leadership of the court as the
country confronts twin epidemics of racism and an aggressive deadly virus,
and her quest for excellence. As I reflect on the Chief Judge and her career,
I think her strongest gift is that of a teacher. Chief Judge Barbera never
stopped teaching!

© 2021 Donald B. Tobin.
∗
Dean and Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.
1. Maryland’s highest court is named the Court of Appeals. It was established by Article 56
of the Maryland Constitution of 1776. Chief Judge Barbera has been an advocate for changing the
name of the Court to the Supreme Court of Maryland. Legislation was passed in the General
Assembly and voters will have an opportunity to vote on the name change in November 2022. See
H.B. 885, 2021 Leg., 442d Sess. (Md. 2021).
2. I take the liberty of sometimes referring to Judge Barbera as “the Chief” when referring to
her time on the Court of Appeals. While she often designates former Chief Judge Robert Bell as
“her Chief,” she has become Maryland’s “Chief,” so I use that reference to her at times in the tribute.
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As is reflected in several of the tributes to the Chief, before she was a
lawyer, she taught preschool in the Cherry Hill neighborhood of Baltimore. 3
She attended law school at night, graduating from the Maryland School of
Law in 1984. I am sure that during this time, she reflected on being both a
teacher and a learner, and she continued that process, of both teaching and
learning, throughout her career. As a judge, she never forgot that she was a
teacher. She used her decisions as a means of teaching us all about the law,
and her decisions, in a sense, were our grades.
I started my legal career as an appellate litigator. When I entered
academia, I quickly realized that the two activities, professor and litigator,
were remarkably similar. As a litigator, I was trying to teach the court about
my case, and about why my answer was the right answer. Unfortunately, as
a litigator, even if I was the teacher, I certainly was not the grader. But
through much of her career, Chief Judge Barbera was.
Chief Judge Barbera’s career exemplifies what it means to be a teacher
and learner, constantly seeking to teach others while also eager to learn from
them. In this Issue, we see the Chief’s desire to both teach and learn in
comments from Attorney General Brian Frosh, her former clerk Rebecca
Foreman, 4 and remarks by Judges Bair, Eyler, Greene, Harrell, Leahy and
Moylan.
Many of our contributors discuss Chief Judge Barbera’s early career in
the Attorney General’s office, but Judge Bair captures it in more detail,
outlining the impact Chief Judge Barbera had within in the office and among
her peers. She was a “line attorney” in the Criminal Appeals Division and
then the Deputy Chief of the division. During this time, Chief Judge Barbera
honed her skills as a writer and advocate. But maybe most importantly, she
built a reputation as a hard worker, skilled jurist, and wonderful writer. 5
The Chief moved from the Attorney General’s Office to become the
Deputy Legal Counsel for Governor Glendening, and then later to Legal
Counsel. Judge Leahy, who worked with the Chief for several years in the
Legal Counsel’s office, highlights some of the important initiatives handled
during their tenure together. 6 These included a lengthy Maryland Public
Information Act matter, the trigger-lock anti-gun violence bill, and

3. See Gary E. Bair, Tribute, Tribute to Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera, 81 MD. L. REV.
416, 418 (2021); Debora Sweet Eyler, Tribute, Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera: Making a
Difference, 81 MD. L. REV. 428, 431 (2021); Glenn T. Harrell, Jr., Tribute, An Irregular Ode to
Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera, 81 MD. L. REV. 452, 454–55 (2021).
4. See Rebecca W. Foreman, Tribute, Tribute to Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera: A Law
Clerk’s Perspective, 81 MD. L. REV. 456, 456 (2021).
5. See Bair, supra note 3, at 417.
6. See Andrea M. Leahy, Tribute, Tribute to Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera, 81 MD. L.
REV. 422 (2021).
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preparation for potential emergency executive orders in the time leading up
to Y2K.
In January 2002, she was appointed to the Maryland Court of Special
Appeals. Both Judge Eyler’s and Judge Greene’s tributes to the Chief
highlight some of her time on the Court of Special Appeals as well as her
contributions to the law while serving on the Court of Appeals.
Judge Eyler’s tribute recognizes then Judge Barbera’s passion for
making a difference, whether that be through her opinions or through her
actions. She traces Judge Barbera’s jurisprudence, stopping along the way to
highlight the ways in which Judge Barbera shows her grasp of nuances in
Maryland law, but also brings good ole common sense to her decisions.
Judge Eyler notes that in Judge Barbera’s debut opinion on the Court of
Special Appeals, Barbera took issue with an antiquated doctrine of
interspousal immunity. Judge Barbera recognized that it was not her role to
modify existing jurisprudence. She followed the existing “antiquated”
jurisprudence, but also, put on her teaching hat and explained why the rule
should be changed. 7 In recognizing Judge Barbera’s clear writing style,
Judge Eyler notes, “[h]er opinions for our Court combined uncluttered
narrative with teacherly guidance, and almost always began, blessedly, with
a paragraph distilling the central issue and the Court’s ultimate position on
it.” 8
In 2008, Judge Barbera joined the Court of Appeals and in 2013 she
became its Chief Judge. Judges Greene provides us with insight into the
Chief as a colleague. Judge Greene’s tribute notes “her considerable talents
as a jurist, administrator, and trailblazer.” 9 He explains her passion for the
Court as an institution, and her work to enhance the public’s perception of
the Court.
Judge Greene’s tribute also provides us insight into the Chief as a person
who brings diverse life experiences to her leadership. He notes that in June
2020, in communications to her fellow judges, she wrote, “[t]he [mass]
protests of the last several weeks have coalesced into a truth that cannot be
ignored: people of color are being denied their rightful equality.” 10 She
further explained, “[w]e must assure that our courts do not suffer bias,

7. Eyler, supra note 3, at 430.
8. Id. at 431.
9. Clayton Greene Jr., Tribute, A Tribute to the Honorable Mary Ellen Barbera, 81 MD. L.
REV. 443, 443 (2021).
10. Id. (citing Statement from Mary Ellen Barbera, C.J., Ct. Appeals Md., Statement on Equal
Justice
under
Law
1
(June 9, 2020),
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/coappeals/pdfs/statementonequaljustice060920.pdf.
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conscious or unconscious. We must examine, together, the reasons for the
disproportionate impact upon people of color, and address those reasons.” 11
In the tribute from Attorney General Frosh, we learn more about the
Chief in her role as Chief Judge and groundbreaker (or glass ceiling breaker).
She is Maryland’s first female Chief Judge and led a court that was majority
female (and also one with a majority of Maryland Law School graduates).
In her capacity as Chief, she leads the Maryland Judiciary. In this role,
she has been a strong advocate and leader in promoting justice and the rule
of law. For those of us who work with her in that role, we see a passionate
advocate for access to justice and for making the judiciary more accessible
to both the bar and the people it serves. Attorney General Frosh highlights
Chief Judge Barbera’s role in advocating for reform of the current bail
system, working to ensure that people do not end up in jail pending trial solely
based on their inability to pay.
Judge Harrell, not surprisingly, entertains us with an “irregular Ode” to
the Chief. He notes that she is a “a born-and-bred teacher who adopts a
relentlessly cheerful demeanor in the delivery of the day’s lesson.”12 Judge
Harrell also highlights the Chief as a colleague, describing their disagreement
in King v. State. 13 Judge Harrell and Chief Judge Barbera were on opposite
sides in the case and took a field trip together to the Supreme Court to watch
the argument. Their relationship, and the method by which they handled an
intellectual dispute, exemplifies the Chief’s commitment to her colleagues
and the Court.
The traits that many of us have come to admire in the Chief may best be
seen by the tribute to her from one of her former law clerks, Rebecca
Foreman, who had the good fortune to experience Chief Judge Barbera first
as a law school student in her class, then as a summer intern in her office, and
finally as a law clerk. In this piece, we see many of her attributes and
contributions through the lens of one of her mentees. Her clerk discusses the
Chief as a teacher, a mentor, a leader, a scholar, and a jurist of the highest
integrity. This clerk even had the bonus of the Chief being her wedding
officiant following her clerkship year!
The final word on the Chief, fittingly, goes to Judge Charles Moylan.
He has known her since she graduated from law school in 1984, when she
began her legal career as a law clerk to Judge Robert Karwacki, who joined
Judge Moylan on the Court of Special Appeals that year. The Chief later
appeared before Judge Moylan and the other Court of Special Appeals judges
during her tenure in the Attorney General’s Office. She also worked with
11. Id. (citing Statement, supra note 10, at 2).
12. Harrell, supra note 3.
13. 425 Md. 550 (2012).
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Judge Moylan on the Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions Committee. The
Chief ultimately was appointed to the Court of Special Appeals vacancy that
was the result of Judge Moylan’s reaching mandatory retirement at the end
of 2000. They continued to serve together on that court (with Judge Moylan
sitting as a senior judge) until the Chief was elevated to the Court of Appeals
in 2008. In his inimitable style, Judge Moylan paints a picture of the Chief
with endearing turns of phrases only he can give us.
Together our commentators present the vision of an excellent jurist, who
is passionate about justice and who works with her colleagues to ensure equal
justice and the rule of law. She worked to make the judiciary more efficient,
and to create an environment where the public has faith in the judicial system.
And she led by example, consistently promoting integrity, collegiality, and
respect. But through it all, she continued to teach those around her.
Sometimes she would teach in the classroom, sometimes from the bench, and
sometimes as a mentor, and Maryland is better off because of her efforts to
teach us all to be better lawyers, advocates, and people. As Judge Bair notes
in his tribute, she is the “most brilliant, and most wonderful jurist Maryland
has ever seen.” 14

14. Bair, supra note 3, at 416. And Judge Bair should know; he is married to Chief Judge
Barbera.

TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY ELLEN BARBERA
GARY E. BAIR ∗
As many know, Chief Judge Barbera (hereinafter “Mary Ellen” or
“Mel”) and I are one of Maryland’s judicial couples. Others have included
the Chasanows (Howard and Debbie), the Motzes (Fred and Diana), the
Krausers (Sherry and Peter), the Eylers (Debby and Jim), and Jim Kenney
and Karen Abrams. Maryland is still a relatively small legal and judicial
community, so I imagine most lawyers and judges know that we are married
even though we have different last names. Now that I am retired from the
bench, I am totally free to express my unbiased and unvarnished views on the
wisest, most brilliant, and most wonderful jurist Maryland has ever seen!
Mary Ellen graduated from the evening program of the University of
Maryland School of Law in 1984, having transferred from the University of
Baltimore School of Law after her first year in that school’s evening program.
After serving as a law clerk to Judge Robert L. Karwacki, she joined the
Maryland Attorney General’s Office as an Assistant Attorney General in the
Criminal Appeals Division. I joined that Division as Chief in 1987 and had
the pleasure to work with Mel for ten years and to teach with her for several
decades on the adjunct faculty of the American University Washington
College of Law.
Mary Ellen started as a “line attorney” in the Criminal Appeals Division
in 1985 and stayed in that position for four years. When an opening arose for
Deputy Chief in 1989, Attorney General Curran appointed Mary Ellen to fill
that slot, and she was outstanding in that position for the next eight years.
During that time, Assistants wrote ten or so appellate briefs every month.
Many of the cases were argued before the Court of Special Appeals, while
some were submitted on brief, and all the cases before the Court of Appeals
were, of course, argued. To state what I trust is obvious, the Assistants in
that Division worked quite hard and appeared before Maryland appellate
judges more than most anyone else. Division attorneys also handled federal
habeas corpus cases in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland and in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In those days, most federal appellate cases were argued in Richmond, but
some were also heard in Baltimore and Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina.
I recall that Mel had arguments in all three locales.
© 2021 Gary E. Bair.
∗
Retired Judge, Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland; Of Counsel, RaquinMercer
Law Offices, Rockville, Maryland.
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The appellate judges were extremely impressed with Mary Ellen’s briefs
and oral arguments. I heard this from many of them personally and I saw
Mel in action from time to time in Annapolis. I know she was a favorite of
Judge Moylan, and I have no doubt he will wax on eloquently about his
impressions in his tribute to Mel. She was also a favorite of many other
judges of that day, including Chief Judge Gilbert, Judge Getty, Judge Bishop,
Judge Wenner, Judge Alpert, Judge Wilner, and Judge McAuliffe. Her briefs
were beautifully written in clear, concise prose. They were thorough, but not
overly long. They were persuasive. They were flawless. In short, the judges
on both appellate courts knew they could rely on what Mel argued the law
stood for and what the record showed on appeal. Her oral arguments were
welcomed by the appellate judges whether they agreed with her position or
not. She was fully prepared for questions from the bench, always well versed
with the record of the case, and a consummate diplomat as advocate. Mel
had that certain touch so few appellate advocates have—forceful without
being strident; capable of conceding when necessary, but only rarely having
to do so; and using her time wisely, that is, knowing when to sit down. She
knew how to read the panel and did not miss an opportunity to please the
panel when possible.
Mary Ellen also worked on numerous cases with me in the United States
Supreme Court. I was the lucky one there, as her talents as appellate advocate
came shining through in that forum as well. The first case I worked on with
her (and Assistant Attorney General Ann Bosse) was Maryland v. Buie. 1 The
three of us wrote that petition for writ of certiorari, which, to our delight, was
granted! The three of us then wrote the briefs and helped prepare one of the
Deputy Attorneys General for oral argument. Several other cases went to the
Supreme Court while Mary Ellen was in the Criminal Appeals Division and
she was an integral part of all of them. These cases, too, were argued by a
Deputy Attorney General or by Attorney General Curran. Only after Mary
Ellen left the Office did I finally have the opportunity to argue two cases in
the Supreme Court (in 2003), by which time she was on the Court of Special
Appeals and we were already married. Even luckier for me, in a way, was to
have her moral support and encouragement during those months of work on
the briefs and preparation for oral argument.
Mary Ellen left the Division in January 1998 for a golden opportunity—
to join the Office of Governor Parris Glendening as Deputy Legal Counsel.
She soon was promoted to Legal Counsel when her predecessor, Andrea
Leahy left that position. Now-Judge Leahy is on the Court of Special
Appeals and has written a piece herein about Mel’s days in the Governor’s
Office. I add just a few thoughts of my own on Mary Ellen’s four years with
1. 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
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the Governor. She loved that job and thoroughly enjoyed working with
Andrea and the Governor, as well as those on staff with her. I recall her long
hours, every day, as she commuted from Ellicott City to Annapolis and back.
And I remember how difficult some of the legislative sessions could be for
her, even though she was not directly working on those matters. Finally,
there were two momentous events during her tenure with the Governor: the
anticipation and preparation for the potential “Y2K” computer chaos as the
year 1999 turned over to the year 2000; and September 11, 2001, when the
country and the region were under attack.
I never had the opportunity to appear before Judge Barbera or have any
of my cases reviewed by her, inasmuch as we were wed in 2000. She was
sworn in on January 4, 2002, while I was still in the Attorney General’s
Office. Because of my supervisory position, she was recused from all
criminal appellate cases for the first part of her tenure on the Court of Special
Appeals. I was then in private practice from 2004 to 2011, and she was
recused from cases that my firm had in the appellate courts. I served as a
circuit court judge in Montgomery County from 2012 to 2020, and, of course,
she was recused from any matter that I handled as a trial judge. I have
watched her on Court of Appeals cases, as those arguments are live-streamed
and now Zoomed. As always, Mary Ellen was the consummate professional
as Chief Judge (and formerly as Associate Judge), polite and principled with
all who appeared before the Court. I will leave it to her former colleagues on
the two courts to further illuminate her career as a jurist.
Let me turn to Mary Ellen as educator. She distinguished herself for
decades in so many ways as a teacher of laypersons, law students, lawyers,
and judges alike. Her first foray in education was as a preschool teacher in
the Cherry Hill neighborhood of Baltimore, where she taught three- and fouryear-old’s. Fresh out of Towson University with a degree in early childhood
education, Mary Ellen taught there for several years, ultimately going to law
school at night when she decided to make a career switch. Just three years
after having finished teaching preschoolers, Mary Ellen made the leap to law
students at the University of Baltimore where she taught a component of the
legal writing program beginning in 1987. She went on to teaching an upperlevel seminar, Appellate Advocacy, in 1997. Her long-term tenure as an
adjunct professor, however, was in connection with the criminal procedure
courses she taught at the American University Washington College of Law.
In the early 1990’s, Mary Ellen was recruited to teach the required course,
Criminal Procedure I, which covers the constitutional law of search and
seizure, confessions, and identifications. Later, she and I co-taught this
course as well as Criminal Procedure II, an upper-level course covering the
constitutional law of grand jury, speedy trial, jury trial, right to counsel,
burdens of proof, double jeopardy, sentencing, appeal, and post-conviction.
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We taught these classes on Monday evenings, from 7:30 to 10:10 PM,
with Criminal Procedure I each fall semester and Criminal Procedure II every
spring semester. We divided the teaching responsibilities evenly, whereby I
would teach the first half of each class, generally going over the assigned
reading, and Mary Ellen would lead a mock hearing session during the last
half of the class. Two students would be the prosecutors and two others
would be the defense counsel, and the suppression hearing or other type of
hearing would illustrate and apply the case law covered in that class and
previous classes during the semester. The students generally enjoyed this
teaching methodology and it allowed us to gauge how the students were
learning over the course of the semester.
As you can imagine, these teaching responsibilities became increasingly
difficult when I became a trial judge in 2012 and Mary Ellen became Chief
Judge in 2013. We persevered until 2017, when we reluctantly stopped
teaching at the law school level. Given Mary Ellen’s speaking commitments,
legislative hearings, and outside engagements both locally and nationally, it
became a little too hectic for her, and jury trial commitments were
problematic for me at times. I know, however, that Mary Ellen touched the
lives of a generation or two of law students in Baltimore and Washington in
so many ways! Not just in the classroom, but before class, during breaks,
and after class (10:30 on a Monday night!), she was always willing to answer
questions, and to give constructive feedback and encouragement to the
students who had performed that night.
Mary Ellen’s commitment to legal education has extended far beyond
the confines of the two local law schools where she served as an adjunct
professor. She taught judges at the Judicial Institute of Maryland (now the
Judicial College), lecturing on numerous criminal law and procedure topics
dating back to 1995. She helped educate lawyers continue their legal
education through various Maryland Institute for Continuing Professional
Education of Lawyers programs in the 1990’s. She spoke on appellate
practice and criminal law issues at numerous Maryland State Bar Association
programs, local county and specialty bar association programs, and Maryland
State’s Attorneys’ Association programs. Mary Ellen helped prepare
attorneys arguing in the Supreme Court by participating as a judge on moot
courts sponsored by the National Association of Attorneys General. Since
2013, she has been on various panels and spoken at semi-annual meetings of
the Conference of State Supreme Court Chief Justices.
Anyone who knows Mary Ellen appreciates her sincerity, humility, and
warmth. This was shared not only with law students she taught, but also with
her legions of law clerks over the past two decades. I encourage you to read
Becky Foreman’s tribute in this issue, as Becky was a student, intern, and
law clerk of Chief Judge Barbera’s. In addition, Mary Ellen’s influence on
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younger students extends far beyond the legal sphere. A graduate of Mercy
High School in Baltimore and of Towson University, Mary Ellen has spoken
to groups of students at both schools. For many years as Chief Judge, she
gave out awards to elementary students in an annual bookmark contest and
greatly enjoyed meeting with the students and their parents for many hours
at this event. She would patiently pose for photos with scores of them! She
also volunteered as a presiding judge in the Montgomery County Teen Court,
a diversion program for first-time juvenile offenders. Although her impact
has been felt by all who have seen and heard her, it is perhaps felt most
personally by the legions of young girls and women who have seen Mary
Ellen shine as the first woman to serve as Chief Judge of Maryland. Although
she may not be as recognizable or as famous as “The Notorious RBG,” her
smiling visage in her signature red robe is known to many women across the
State. She has been an amazing role model and mentor to so many people,
most of whom will never be known to Mel.
As head of the judicial branch, Mary Ellen’s style of leadership also had
a profound impact on the people of Maryland she served, the incumbent and
senior judges who worked with her, the lawyers who appeared at all levels of
the court system, and the rank-and-file judiciary employees who she
impacted day to day. As Judge Greene so aptly and eloquently writes in
another part of this tribute, Mary Ellen was a visionary head of the judicial
system for the past eight years. She always was highly principled and strove
to “do the right thing.” Some of those qualities were always with her as a
person, but I have no doubt that they were further incorporated into her legal
persona through her service to the people of Maryland under the tutelage of
the two outstanding Attorneys General she worked under, namely Steve
Sachs and Joe Curran.
Particularly during the last year and a half of her tenure as Chief Judge,
her character as a leader was tested like never before. The pandemic brought
so many unforeseen challenges to running a court system, not that the job in
non-pandemic times is all that easy either. As the Stoic philosopher Seneca
observed two millennia ago: “There is no great credit in behaving bravely in
times of prosperity, when life glides easily with a favoring current, neither
does a calm sea and fair wind display the art of the pilot. Some foul weather
is wanted to prove his courage.” 2 Needless to say, the Chief Judge’s skills as
a pilot were courageously demonstrated in the final eighteen months of her
tenure.
It should be noted here that the courts were never really “closed,” even
during the most locked down time in the spring of 2020. Emergency matters

2. Letter from Lucius Annaeus Seneca the Younger, Roman Stoic Philosopher to De
Consolatione ad Marciam (written around 40 AD).
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were still being heard, a skeleton crew of judges, law clerks, assistants, court
room clerks, administrative clerks, and others reported to work in all the
courthouses across Maryland. A series of emergency administrative orders
were promulgated during these many months to expand operations when
possible and retract when necessary. Judiciary employees, along with most
others, needed steady and creative leadership, and Mary Ellen provided it.
Her frequent videos explaining where we were and where we were going as
a judiciary brought calm to otherwise troubled waters. I know how much
everyone, both within the judiciary and on the outside, appreciated the efforts
she made to balance the competing needs and wants of all involved in the
court system over this challenging time.
No doubt her roots growing up in a small row home in Hampden, where
she shared space and a single bathroom with her brothers, parents, and
grandfather, helped to mold her into the adult she has become. And her
parochial education at St. Thomas Aquinas lower school and Mercy High
School formed a strong moral core for her values as well. Going to college
at Towson University and then raising two children while teaching pre-school
and attending law school at night solidified her strong work ethic if it ever
needed it. Now Mary Ellen and I will have a little more time to travel and to
visit with our four adult children and four grandchildren. She will be missed
by those she has so graciously touched over her professional career, but I
have no doubt she will continue to serve the public interest in new ways that
will make this a more fair and just state and nation.

TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY ELLEN BARBERA
ANDREA M. LEAHY ∗
In 1998, Mary Ellen Barbera left the Criminal Appeals Division of the
Maryland Attorney General’s office, where she had earned the reputation as
an exceptional appellate lawyer, to join Governor Parris N. Glendening’s
legal team in Annapolis. It was before social media, when we still wore
beepers and David Simon’s riveting “Homicide: Life on the Street” was
collecting Primetime Emmy Awards. Governor Glendening had already
racked up many achievements that won national acclaim. Among other
things, he brought the Cleveland Browns to Baltimore; and he won legislative
support for the 1996 Gun Violence Act, a statewide ban on smoking, and the
Smart Growth and Neighborhood Conservation Act, pioneering what would
become a national model for containing urban sprawl.
It was also an election year, and Governor Glendening was in a heated
rematch against Republican candidate Ellen R. Sauerbrey. Governor
Glendening’s ambitious Minority Business Program and initiatives to
diversify the judiciary—including his appointment of the first African
American Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals—threatened many in the old
guard. The Governor’s bold and progressive agenda was not embraced by
everyone, and his “flip-flop” on the Intercounty Connector drew criticism
from the business community, giving Ms. Sauerbrey grist for her mill.
It was against this backdrop that Mary Ellen became the Governor’s
Deputy Legal Counsel and would soon become one of the Governor’s closest
advisors. At the time, I was the Governor’s chief counsel, and I remember
distinctly how pleased and impressed the Governor was by Mary Ellen’s
rapid mastery of her new role. Governor Glendening recalls:
Mary Ellen had a strong sense of the mix of policy and politics.
I would often say “you can have good policy and bad politics and
you will fail. Or you can have good politics and bad policy and
you still fail.” Mary Ellen was one of a talented team that
repeatedly found the middle ground link between policy and
politics.
The pace was not only fast, it was relentless. Dinner was either very
late or the standard chicken plate served when representing the Governor at
community events. The legal counsel to Governor Glendening had the
© 2021 Andrea M. Leahy.
∗
Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
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daunting responsibility of staying ahead of daily issues and “advising” the
former professor, who earned his PhD at age 23 and typically, by 8:00 a.m.,
had already speed-read numerous national and local newspapers of general
circulation and marked up his briefing papers from the prior day.
The issues that needed to be addressed were varied and mostly highly
charged. Because of her fluid thinking and writing skills, Mary Ellen was
able to draft speeches and briefing papers on legally and politically sensitive
issues immediately—because they were always needed yesterday. Once, I
recall, a few days after she arrived, I asked Mary Ellen to grab the blinking
phone line as I ran out to address an urgent matter. On the line was a very
unhappy cabinet secretary, and, unable to tee it up for her, the best I could do
was say “good luck.” I later learned that, like everything else, she handled it
beautifully.
We worked with the Attorney General’s Office on State agency matters
and litigation filed against the State and the Governor. One case stands out
because of the time it consumed, and the many laughs we shared working on
it. In 1996, the Washington Post Company (“the Post”) made a request under
the Maryland Public Information Act (“MPIA”) for the telephone (including
cell phone) and scheduling records of the Governor and everyone on his staff
for a two-year period. Most of the requests for records that were not already
public were denied under executive privilege and various MPIA exemptions.
Despite continued negotiations, in which the Governor’s Office provided
more records and the Post narrowed its requests, the parties hit an impasse
when the Post filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County on
December 4, 1997. Eventually, the matter reached the Court of Appeals. 1
The Court held, among other things, that while records of calls from
telephones in Government House are not covered by the MPIA, 2 the
Governor could not protect from disclosure the telephone and scheduling
records from the Governor’s office as personnel records under the MPIA, 3 or
under a blanket claim of executive privilege.4 Instead, the records were
subject to in camera review to allow the court to discern whether, among
other things, certain disclosures would interfere with the deliberative process
in the Governor’s Office. 5
Throughout 1998 and 1999, Mary Ellen and I spent countless hours
buried in the Shaw House under boxes of schedules and telephone bills. We
had to review the call detail records to help then Deputy and Assistant
Attorneys General Carmen Shepard and Larry Fletcher-Hill prepare for in
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

See Off. of the Governor v. Wash. Post Co., 360 Md. 520, 759 A.2d 249 (2002).
Id. at 538, 759 A.2d at 259.
Id. at 547–48, 759 A.2d. at 264.
Id. at 561–63, 759 A.2d at 271–73.
Id. at 562–64, 759 A.2d at 272–73.
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camera review by the circuit court of “a proposed redacted version of those
records with a detailed memorandum explaining why the redacted
information was privileged.” 6 As the Court of Appeals later noted, “[t]he
telephone records from the State House are numerous and complex.” 7 In
describing one office suite served by eighteen separate telephone lines, the
Court observed, “[b]ecause use of the different telephone instruments within
the entire suite is not restricted, anyone within the suite can use any one of
the instruments and, therefore, could access all eighteen lines.” 8 In order to
identify whether a particular call was privileged, we had to track not only
who made the call, but who was called. With the technology at our disposal
at the time, many numbers were impossible to figure out without calling them
ourselves. “Hello. Who is this?” [Reply] “Who is this?” We tried many
ways to explain, politely, that we just needed to identify to whom the
telephone or cell phone that was called from the Governor’s Office belonged.
Some of the responses we received were hilarious, if not fit for publication.
Mary Ellen was a champion at identifying callers because she has an innate
sense of what to say and how to connect with people.
Under Governor Glendening, the Office of Legal Counsel was directly
involved with, and sometimes directed, major policy initiatives. According
to the Governor:
Mary Ellen had a strong but diplomatic influence on major policies
during my Administration that had extraordinarily positive impact
in Maryland, many of which were very controversial. While she
was always diplomatic with the legislature and the public, I think
the strong part was sometimes reserved for our internal
conversations. A look or a firm “now, Governor let’s not
forget . . .” often moved the conversation in a different direction.
Governor Glendening recalls several important initiatives that Mary
Ellen was involved in, after she became Chief Legal Counsel, that led to
policies that have impacted Maryland for decades. “One was my
Administration’s anti-gun violence bill in 2000. It was a strong bill, a
complex bill with an array of angry opponents. Our team, on which Mary
Ellen played an important role, put together a strong and diplomatic offense
and an exciting mixture of good policy and politics.” Indeed, Mary Ellen
took the lead, along with then Deputy Legal Counsel, Sandra Benson
Brantley, on staffing the Governor’s Task Force on Childproof Guns. 9 The
task force report laid the groundwork for legislation that required, among
6. Id. at 530, 759 A.2d at 255.
7. Id. at 541, 759 A.2d at 260.
8. Id. at 541, 759 A.2d at 260–61.
9. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S TASK FORCE ON CHILDPROOF GUNS (1999),
https://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/004000/004181/unrestrict
ed/20071019e.pdf.
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other things, built-in locks on all guns sold in Maryland. The requirement
was the first of its kind in the nation. President Bill Clinton attended the bill
signing at the State House on April 12, 2000, where he declared, “I hope that
the United States Congress is paying attention to this event today, because
every child in America deserves the protection you have given Maryland’s
children.” 10
Mary Ellen also contributed significantly to the Governor’s effort to
prepare the State for an array of disasters that many feared would arise from
Y2K. She had the legal office ready emergency executive orders in the event
of logistical challenges and made other preparations. 11 Although no
emergency issues arose from Y2K, those preparations significantly helped
the Administration act quickly to respond to the tragic events on September
11, 2001.
Of course, Mary Ellen played a significant role in Governor
Glendening’s ongoing efforts to diversify the bench. The Governor recounts:
It was, therefore, a certain poetic justice when I appointed Mary
Ellen to the Court of Special Appeals in January 2002, not knowing
that it would be the first step to her appointment by then Governor
Martin O’Malley in 2013 to become the first woman Chief Judge
of the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Judge Barbera became chief of the seven-member Court of Appeals and
CEO of the judicial branch of government. The State Court Administrator,
Pamela Harris, relates:
Chief Judge Barbera’s foresight and her intrinsic ability to
assimilate quickly on matters affecting the $660,000,000 budget;
addressing the legislature or executive branch with a cordial, yet
unwavering approach; and her efforts, grounded in a living wage
ideology, to increase wages for judiciary employees—all helped
forge an effective administration to meet the challenges
confronting the judiciary.
Chief Judge Barbera’s valuable experience in the Governor’s office—
working on legislation and implementing and defending executive policies—
contributed to her agility in managing the relationships between the judicial
branch and the other branches of government. Chief Judge Barbera related
to me that in one of her first meetings as Chief—with the “Lion of the
Senate,” President Mike Miller—he demanded, “what were you thinking
when you appointed Morrisey Chief of the District Court?!” She responded,
“isn’t it good that the judiciary remain non-partisan and apolitical?” Senator
10. Thomas W. Waldron & Michael Dresser, Clinton Puts Spotlight on Md. Gun Law;
President Attends as Glendening Signs Landmark Legislation; ‘Forefront of Change’; Congress Is
Urged to Follow Suit, Pass Stalled Measure, BALT. SUN, April 12, 2000, at 1B.
11. See, e.g., Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.1999.16 (June 2, 1999).
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Miller smiled broadly and conceded that Chief Judge John Morrisey was “a
very good guy.”
Several years later, in 2018, Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera received
the Maryland Senate’s prestigious First Citizen’s Award—the first time in
more than two decades that the award had been given to a member of the
Maryland Judiciary. 12 When presenting the award, Senate President Mike
Miller said, “Chief Judge Barbera is a brilliant jurist, a teacher, and a leader
who strives to better all of us in public service.” 13
After all of those years working with Governor Glendening and Mary
Ellen to create better opportunities for women, I saw it as the grand slam
when Governor Martin O’Malley appointed Judge Mary Ellen Barbera as the
first woman to head the judiciary. I have admired Chief Judge Barbera’s skill
as an administrator and strength in protecting the independence of the
judiciary, all while maintaining her outstanding scholarship as a jurist.
Ms. Harris, the State Court Administrator observes, “Judge Barbera’s
accomplishments over her eight years as Chief Judge are unparalleled and
will be an extraordinarily strong foundation for those who next will have the
privilege of building upon them.”
The following observations by Governors O’Malley and Glendening
sum up well Judge Barbera’s tenure as Chief:
In Mary Ellen Barbera, we found an outstanding jurist, a
collaborative leader, and a deeply compassionate human being.
Her honesty, integrity, and intellect were known throughout the
legal communities of our State. But it was during the child refugee
crisis of 2013 that I saw the true colors of her character. While
other states’ chief judges might “stand back and let it all be,” Judge
Barbera rallied the bar to recruit pro-bono legal representation for
those traumatized and frightened kids. Mary Ellen understood
that—in our country—laws are created to serve people, not vice
versa. And she saw, in each child’s case, the cause of justice—
which is to say, the cause of human dignity.
Governor Martin J. O’Malley
Chief Judge Barbera has repeatedly continued to use her strong but
diplomatic personality and her wonderful understanding of the
needed mix of policy and politics to solve major challenges facing
the courts. Not the expected issues of law, but the unexpected
challenges of the times—keeping the courts functioning during the
12. Press Release, Maryland Judiciary, Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera Honored by Maryland
Senate
as
a
“First
Citizen”
(March
26,
2018),
https://www.courts.state.md.us/media/newsitem/2018/item20180326.
13. Id.
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COVID Pandemic, meeting new controversies like the excessive
use of cash bail process or the needs of the Maryland judicial
system during these times of demands for social and legal justice.
Chief Judge Barbera’s unique combination of skills and
personality has helped lead the courts through these challenging
times.
Governor Parris N. Glendening

CHIEF JUDGE MARY ELLEN BARBERA: MAKING A
DIFFERENCE
DEBORAH SWEET EYLER *
One might imagine that, were he with us to speak on the subject
today, Thomas Aquinas, whose quoted words stand at the outset of
the Majority’s opinion, likely would conclude that the result
reached by the Majority is neither just nor merciful. It is neither
just nor merciful, much less compliant with the Eighth
Amendment, that, currently in Maryland, a young teenager who
commits a crime that leads to a life sentence is likely to spend the
rest of his or her life in prison. And it is not justice to have on the
books the “possibility of parole” yet provide a protocol for granting
or denying parole that is without standards to guide those who are
the decision makers: the Parole Commission and the Governor.
Under the United States Constitution, a meaningful opportunity for
release cannot exist in name only, as it now does in Maryland. 1
With those words Chief Judge Barbera concluded her dissenting opinion
in Carter v. State. 2 The majority she sharply criticized recognized that
Maryland’s parole eligibility statute 3 failed to afford juveniles sentenced to
life in prison with the possibility of parole “some meaningful opportunity to
obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation” as the
Eighth Amendment requires. 4 With this she agreed. But the majority
© 2021 Deborah Sweet Eyler.
*
Judge (Ret.), Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
1. Carter v. State, 461 Md. 295, 371, 192 A.3d 695, 739 (2018) (Barbera, C.J., dissenting)
(joined by Greene and Adkins, JJ.) (internal citations omitted). Chief Judge Barbera, joined by
these same judges, concurred in part in another aspect of the Carter decision.
2. 461 Md. 295, 192 A.3d 695 (2018). Chief Judge Barbera, joined by these same judges,
concurred in part in another aspect of the Carter decision.
3. MD. CODE CORR. SERVS. § 7-301 (2017).
4. Carter, 461 Md. at 306, 192 A.3d at 701 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75
(2010)). Beginning in 2005, the Supreme Court decided a series of Eighth Amendment cases in
which it held that certain punishments, when applied to defendants who had committed their crimes
as juveniles, were cruel and unusual or only could be imposed in exceptional circumstances. See
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (prohibiting the death penalty for homicide offenders who
were juveniles when they committed their crimes); Graham, 560 U.S. 48 (prohibiting life without
parole for non-homicide offenders who were juveniles when they committed their crimes); Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (prohibiting life without parole as a mandatory sentence for
homicide offenders who were juveniles when they committed their crimes); Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller applies retroactively to convictions that were final before it
was decided). In Miller, the Court did not ban discretionary life without parole sentences for
juvenile homicide offenders but made known its expectation that such a sentence only would be
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satisfied itself that the constitutional defect was cured by regulations
mandating the Parole Commission to consider special factors pertaining to
juveniles and an Executive Order cabining the Governor’s otherwise
unfettered discretion over parole decisions for juvenile lifers. To Chief Judge
Barbera, this patchwork, standard-less repair to a parsimonious parole
scheme was insufficient to give juveniles sentenced to life with the possibility
of parole the justice and mercy the Supreme Court envisioned.
Although Chief Judge Barbera only persuaded two, not three, judges to
join her position in Carter, ensuing events reveal the power of her dissenting
voice to effect change on a broader policy level. In its 2021 Session, the
Maryland General Assembly, overriding vetoes, eliminated life without the
possibility of parole as a sentencing option for those who committed
homicide crimes when they were juveniles.5 Moreover, it removed the
governor from the parole process for all people sentenced to life in prison. 6
This legislation freed the Maryland parole system of some of the pitfalls
Chief Judge Barbera identified in her Carter dissent—the same result that
would have been obtained had a fourth judge converted her dissent into the
majority opinion.
In eight years leading the Maryland Judiciary, Chief Judge Barbera
authored many majority opinions on new and sometimes cutting-edge issues.
A few examples include: Lewis v. State 7 (finding odor of marijuana itself is
not sufficient to establish probable cause to suspect possession in criminal
amount); Romero v. Perez 8 (establishing broad standards to be applied in
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status cases); State v. Jones 9 (abrogating the
common law accomplice corroboration rule); Hackney v. State 10 (adopting
imposed upon “the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” 567 U.S. at
479–80 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). These cases all were premised
upon the concept, supported by science, that juveniles differ from adults in brain development and
maturity, and therefore the considerations upon sentencing them should not be the same as those for
sentencing adults. This year, in Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259, slip op. (U.S. Apr. 22, 2021),
the Supreme Court stepped back from that trend in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, holding that
a homicide offender whose crime was committed when he was a juvenile could be sentenced to life
in prison without the possibility of parole. The Court did not require an express or implicit finding
of permanent incorrigibility, so long as the sentencing scheme was not mandatory. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, asserted that the majority’s
opinion “distorts Miller and Montgomery beyond recognition.” Jones, No. 18-1259, slip op. at 5
(Sotomayor, J. dissenting).
5. S.B. 494, 2021 Leg., 442d Sess. (Md. 2021) (adding to sections 6-235 and 8-110 of the
Criminal Procedure Article). The bill also authorized courts to sentence juveniles convicted as
adults to a sentence less than the prescribed minimum term.
6. S.B. 202, 2021 Leg., 442d Sess. (Md. 2021) (repealing and reenacting with amendments
sections 4-305(b) and 7-301(d) of the Correctional Services Article).
7. 470 Md. 1, 233 A.3d 86 (2020).
8. 463 Md. 182, 205 A.3d 903 (2019).
9. 466 Md. 142, 216 A.3d 907 (2019).
10. 459 Md. 108, 184 A.3d 414 (2018).

2021]

TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY ELLEN BARBERA

413

the prison mailbox rule); Cruz-Quintanilla v. State 11 (permitting evidence of
gang membership at sentencing under certain circumstances); Moats v.
State 12 (requiring a warrant for search of cell phone under Fourth
Amendment); Twigg v. State 13 (recognizing the concept of sentencing
packages). In these cases, Chief Judge Barbera spoke for the Court, often in
unanimous opinions. 14 As Carter demonstrates, however, Chief Judge
Barbera’s dissenting and concurring opinions give us an “up close and
personal” understanding of her concepts of law and justice.
Before delving in to explore some of her writings, I pause to point out
that only a few months after assuming her seat on the Court of Special
Appeals, then-Judge Barbera experienced first-hand what can be the
frustrating constraints of serving on an intermediate appellate court. As she
knew from years spent handling criminal appeals for the Attorney General’s
Office, the Court of Special Appeals is an error-correcting body that is not
designed to function as a change-agent. In her debut reported opinion,
Bozman v. Bozman, 15 which concerned the doctrine of interspousal
immunity, Judge Barbera confronted that limitation head on. She described
the doctrine as “aged, if not antiquated,” and, after recounting its history,
including the laudable purposes it served in bygone times, concluded that it
performs no valid function today. 16 “We remain unconvinced . . . that
retention of this doctrine best reflects the will of the people in this
State . . . .” 17 Nevertheless, in resignation, she wrote: “Regardless, we are
bound to follow the dictates of the law as it presently exists in Maryland.” 18
In less than a year, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari in Bozman and
abrogated the doctrine. 19
Judge Barbera’s term of confinement ended with her ascension to the
Court of Appeals in 2008. I was privileged to serve with her for six years on
the Court of Special Appeals and in that time came to know her as a
thoughtful colleague, direct and firm in her thinking, but always open to
persuasion and attuned to trends in the law. Like the best of jurists, her “take”
11. 455 Md. 35, 165 A.3d 517 (2017).
12. 455 Md. 682, 168 A.3d 952 (2017).
13. 447 Md. 1, 133 A.3d 1125 (2016).
14. As Chief, Judge Barbera authored fifty-four opinions in non-Attorney Grievance
Commission cases, forty of which were unanimous decisions, that is, without any dissenting or
concurring opinions.
15. 146 Md. App. 183, 806 A.2d 740 (2002).
16. Id. at 185, 806 A.2d at 741 (quoting Linton v. Linton, 46 Md. App. 660, 661, 420 A.2d
1249 (1980)).
17. Id. at 195, 806 A.2d at 747.
18. Id. at 196, 806 A.2d at 747.
19. Bozman v. Bozman, 372 Md. 429, 813 A.2d 257 (2002).
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on a difficult case was not readily predictable. She followed the law where
it took her, carefully exploring the issues to find her path. Her opinions for
our Court combined uncluttered narrative with teacherly guidance, and
almost always began, blessedly, with a paragraph distilling the central issue
and the Court’s ultimate position on it. Never pretentious or overwritten, her
opinions were refined, incisive, and to the point.
Those qualities remained hallmarks of Chief Judge Barbera’s writing
after she moved to the less limiting forum of the Court of Appeals. With that
freedom came the challenge and burden of overseeing the development of
Maryland law, whether through changes in the common law, as Judge
Barbera could not accomplish in Bozman, or through constitutional and
statutory interpretation. Especially in her dissents, we can witness her
navigating the waters between faithful adherence to established principles
and considered evolution of those principles, sometimes in the context of
societal changes in outlook, or progress in science and technology.
On expansion of the scope of the constitutional rights recognized in the
Maryland Declaration of Rights, for instance, Chief Judge Barbera has taken
a path of thoughtful restraint, deviating when she found it necessary to protect
essential rights. In DeWolfe v. Richmond II, 20 her first dissent after being
appointed Chief, Judge Barbera methodically dissected the majority’s
holding that the due process protections afforded by Article 24 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee the right to counsel in an initial
appearance before a District Court Commissioner. The holding was a rebuke
to the legislature, which, after the Court of Appeals announced in its prior
opinion in DeWolfe v. Richmond I 21 that the Public Defenders Act afforded
that right, promptly amended the Act to eliminate it.
After pointing out that the cases the majority sought refuge in all
involved in-court proceedings, conducted by a judge, in which the defendant
faced the potential of a final, court-ordered term of incarceration, Chief Judge
Barbera catalogued the ways in which an initial appearance before a district
court commissioner shares none of those features. In contrast, she explained,
the procedure reasonably balances the individual’s need for a fair, informal
process with the State’s interest in a prompt assessment by a neutral party:
The initial bail hearing before a Commissioner does not result in a
final determination of incarceration because no decision made by
a Commissioner will lead to a defendant’s languishing in custody
without judicial review. Indeed, the law affirmatively requires that
the Commissioner’s initial bail decision be reviewed quickly by a
judge, at a formal, in-court proceeding, at which every defendant—
20. 434 Md. 444, 76 A.3d 1019 (2013) (Barbera, J. dissenting) (joined by Harrell and Adkins,
JJ.).
21. 434 Md. 403, 76 A.3d 962 (2012).
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indigent or not—is entitled to representation by counsel. The very
fact of speedy review of the Commissioner’s preliminary
determination, by a judge at a formal court proceeding where
defense counsel can argue against the Commissioner’s initial bail
decision, negates any realistic concern about unfair procedural
process. 22
Chief Judge Barbera admonished against expanding the Article 24 due
process right to counsel—traditionally broader than the Sixth Amendment
right—to a limited, non-final proceeding subject to prompt review in a forum
where the defendant would be represented by counsel.
In a similar vein, shortly before ascending to the Chief position, Judge
Barbera took issue with the plurality’s conclusion in Doe v. Department of
Public Safety 23 that application of the then current version of the Maryland
Sex Offender Registration Act violated the ex post facto clause of Article 17
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The defendant committed acts of
child sexual abuse before the registration statute was enacted, but was
convicted of his crimes afterward, when the statute was on the books but did
not cover him. Under later amendments to the Act, he was required to
register as a sex offender, and then to do so for life.
In dissent, Chief Judge Barbera emphasized that the Court of Appeals
invariably had construed Article 17 on equal footing with the ex post facto
clause in Article 1, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution, employing the
same analytical rubric to determine whether it had been violated and giving
persuasive value to federal cases interpreting the clause. She explained that
the federal ex post facto clause prohibits a change in the punishment for a
crime that inflicts a greater punishment than applied to the crime when it was
committed. It does not apply, however, when the legislature’s intention was
to create a civil regulatory scheme—unless the effect of the scheme is so
punitive as to negate the original intent. Pointing out that the Court of
Appeals had applied this “intent-effects” test to uphold an earlier version of
the Maryland Sex Offender Registration Act, and that the plurality was
relying on a Supreme Court case that Court itself had discredited, Chief Judge
Barbera found principled guidance in the Supreme Court’s rejection of a
similar ex post facto challenge to Alaska’s Sex Offender Registration Act.24
Once again, she heeded the precept that movement away from established
principles only should be taken when necessary to protect essential rights,
which was not the case with a statute creating a civil system to protect
children from convicted sex offenders.

22. Richmond II, 434 Md. at 468–69, 76 A.3d at 1033 (Barbera, J. dissenting).
23. 430 Md. 535, 62 A.3d 123 (2013) (Barbera, J. dissenting).
24. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
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By contrast, in other cases, Chief Judge Barbera dissented when she
perceived the majority hobbling rights Maryland law affords that are more
generous than similar rights conferred by federal law. Two coram nobis
cases illustrate this. In Miller v. State, 25 Miller, a longtime resident of the
United States but not a citizen, was detained upon attempting to return to the
United States from his home country of Belize. Deportation proceedings
were instituted against him under the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 26 based on his guilty plea, many years
earlier, to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. In seeking coram
nobis relief, he alleged that he did not plead guilty knowingly and voluntarily
because his lawyer did not advise him on the record of the possible
immigration consequences of pleading guilty.
After Miller was denied relief and during the pendency of his appeal,
the Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 27 a post-conviction case
applying Strickland v. Washington, 28 to hold that constitutionally competent
defense counsel must inform a defendant that a conviction for drug
distribution would subject him to automatic deportation; and then decided
Chaidez v. United States, 29 holding that under the federal standard for
retroactive application of newly decided cases, Padilla only applied
prospectively. 30 The Miller majority concluded that Chaidez compelled the
conclusion that Padilla did not apply retroactively to Miller’s case.
Chief Judge Barbera observed in dissent that the Court of Appeals
previously had rejected the limited federal standard for retroactive
application of case law. Rather, in Maryland a judicial decision applies
retroactively unless it overrules prior law and declares a new principle of law,
in which case it only applies prospectively. 31 Indeed, only two years earlier,
in Denisyuk v. State, 32 the Court held that under that standard, Padilla applied
retroactively to postconviction claims challenging guilty pleas entered from
April 1, 1997, the effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, forward. 33

25. 435 Md. 174, 77 A.3d 1030 (2013) (Barbera, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Greene, J. and
Bell, C.J. (ret.)).
26. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (eff. Apr. 1, 1997).
27. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
28. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
29. 568 U.S. 342 (2013).
30. The federal standard, established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is whether the
case announced a new rule of constitutional criminal procedure. The Chaidez Court held that
Padilla did so, and therefore did not apply retroactively.
31. See State v. Daughtry, 419 Md. 35, 78, 18 A.3d 60, 86 (2011); Houghton v. County
Comm’rs of Kent Cnty., 307 Md. 216, 219–20, 513 A.2d 291, 292–93 (1986).
32. 422 Md. 462, 30 A.3d 914 (2011).
33. Id. at 478–79, 30 A.3d at 923–24.
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In the Denisyuk majority opinion, authored by then-Judge Barbera, the
Court reasoned that Padilla did not declare a new principle of law but simply
applied the law established in Strickland to a new set of facts. The effect of
that holding, which was consistent with established Maryland legal
principles, was to enable a generation of non-citizens facing deportation
proceedings based on guilty pleas to seek relief through post-conviction or
coram nobis proceedings. In Miller, Chief Judge Barbera took the position
that cutting off access to that relief was not mandated by Chaidez, as the
federal retroactivity standard did not apply in Maryland and flatly
contradicted Deniyuk in an affront to stare decisis, all to the detriment of
those whose guilty pleas had not been knowing and voluntary. 34
In State v. Smith, 35 another coram nobis case stemming from deportation
proceedings brought against a resident non-citizen of the United States who
had pleaded guilty to a drug-related charge many years before, a fractured
Court held, by one majority, that Smith had not waived her right to coram
nobis relief, but by another majority, that her guilty plea had been knowing
and voluntary. Chief Judge Barbera dissented from the second majority
opinion. She explained that Maryland Rule 4-242 creates strict requirements
for accepting a guilty plea that afford protection to a defendant beyond the
basic constitutional due process standards established by the Supreme Court,
including the process set out in subsection (c). 36 A prior conversation in
which Smith’s lawyer talked to her about the drug-related conspiracy charge
she was facing was not sufficient to satisfy the Rule:
[A]ny such discussion outside the plea hearing record, while
arguably enough to satisfy the federal constitutional minimum of
34. Probably Chief Judge Barbera’s most well-known discussion of the doctrine of stare decisis
is her majority opinion in State v. Waine, 444 Md. 692, 122 A.3d 294 (2015), in which the State
asked the Court to overrule its controversial decision in Unger v. State, 427 Md. 383, 48 A.3d 242
(2012). Unger concerned Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, which states, in part,
that “[i]n the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact.”
Specifically, the Unger Court held that in a prior rule implementing Article 23 by requiring judges
to instruct juries in criminal cases the court’s instructions on the law were advisory only. The Unger
Court overruled prior cases interpreting Article 23 as being limited and “effectively opened the door
to postconviction relief for persons tried during the era of the advisory only jury instruction.” Waine,
444 Md. at 696, 122 A.3d at 296. In declining to overrule Unger, Chief Judge Barbera stated: “To
hold otherwise would depart from the principles of stare decisis, generate uncertainty, and,
ultimately, undermine trust and confidence in the rule of law.” Id. at 695, 122 A.3d at 295.
35. 443 Md. 572, 117 A.3d 1093 (2015) (Barbera, J. dissenting) (joined by Greene and Adkins,
JJ. (Part II)).
36. Maryland Rule 4-242(c) provides, in relevant part:
Plea of guilty. The court may not accept a plea of guilty, including a conditional plea of
guilty, until after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted
by the court, the State’s Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination
thereof, the court determines and announces on the record that (1) the defendant is
pleading voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences
of the plea; and (2) there is a factual basis for the plea.
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due process accorded under Bradshaw, 37 should not carry the day
under Rule 4-242(c). Again, the Rule requires more: the record of
the plea itself must be such as to permit a meaningful determination
by the court before whom the plea is presented that the defendant’s
plea is knowing and voluntary in that the defendant has had
explained to him or her the rights that are forgone by the plea of
guilty and willingly foregoes them; has had the nature of the crime
addressed such that the defendant understands that to which he or
she is pleading guilty; and that the facts support the plea. 38
Especially in the area of constitutional criminal procedure, Chief Judge
Barbera has championed faithful application of precedent and, when
movement away from the strict application of the doctrine of stare decisis
becomes necessary, proceeding properly. 39 Her dissent in Agurs v. State 40—
a case involving an exception to an exception—is a good example. The
central issue there was whether the Leon 41 good faith exception to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule saved a search executed on a warrant issued
without probable cause or whether the third exception to the Leon good faith
exception applied. More specifically: Was the affidavit supporting the
37. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175 (2005).
38. Smith, 443 Md. at 621, 117 A.3d at 1122.
39. Of the twelve dissenting opinions Chief Judge Barbera authored during her tenure on the
Court of Appeals, all but one were in criminal law or procedure or “criminal-adjacent” cases (such
as coram nobis proceedings, which are civil, but grow out of criminal cases). In addition to the
dissents discussed in the body and footnotes of this article, all of which fall into those categories,
Chief Judge Barbera dissented in part in Spencer v. State, 450 Md. 530, 572, 149 A.3d 610, 634
(2016), opining that a trial judge did not clearly err in rejecting as pretextual the supposedly raceneutral explanations the defendant’s lawyer gave for exercising a pattern of peremptory challenges
based on race, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). In Schreyer v. Chaplain, 416
Md. 94, 5 A.3d 1054 (2010), another “criminal-adjacent” case, in which the Court was called upon
to interpret statutes conferring immunity upon police officers exercising emergency powers under
particular circumstances, then-Judge Barbera disagreed with the majority’s narrow interpretation of
“pursuing a violator,” opining that the officer was doing just that even though the suspected violator
did not know that was what the officer was doing. Id. at 121–25, 5 A.3d at 1069–72 (Barbera, J.
dissenting) (joined by Harrell and Battaglia, JJ.).
The sole non-criminal or “criminal-adjacent” case in which then-Judge Barbera dissented
nevertheless concerned a fundament right—to raise one’s child. In Mulligan v. Corbett, 426 Md.
670, 45 A.3d 243 (2012), a man sought mandatory genetic testing under the Paternity Subtitle of
the Family Law Article to determine the paternity of a child born to a woman he had had sexual
relations with while she was married. The child was born after the mother was divorced. The
majority held that the child was not born “out of wedlock,” as that phrase is used in the Paternity
Subtitle, and therefore the plaintiff was not automatically entitled to genetic testing. Instead, to
rebut a presumption of legitimacy, he would have to show it was in the best interest of the child,
who was living with the mother and her ex-husband, for him to obtain genetic testing. Judge
Barbera, joined by Judge Raker, dissented on the ground that a child born after the mother is
divorced is a child born out of wedlock, and that the majority was raising unreasonable stumbling
blocks to a scientific determination of paternity where there was significant evidence that the
plaintiff in fact was the child’s father.
40. 415 Md. 62, 998 A.2d 868 (2010) (Barbera, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Adkins, J.).
41. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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warrant application “so lacking in probable cause as to render official belief
in its existence entirely unreasonable?” 42 The majority held that because the
affidavit did not establish a direct nexus between Agurs, who was suspected
of being a high-level drug distributor, and his house, no competent police
officer could have executed the search warrant for that house with a
reasonable belief that it was issued based on probable cause.
Assuming for the sake of the opinion that the warrant had been issued
without substantial basis, Judge Barbera emphasized that the majority’s
analysis did not comport with United States Supreme Court precedent or
reasoning. The Supreme Court adopted the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, she explained, to encourage law enforcement to obtain and
rely upon warrants; and it has narrowly interpreted the third exception to
Leon to further that purpose. That exception only will apply if “no
‘thoughtful and competent judge’ could find that an officer could reasonably
believe there was probable cause for the search.” 43 In prior cases applying
federal case law, the Court of Appeals had recognized that there need not be
a direct nexus between the suspect and the place to be searched for the police
to have acted in good faith. Rather, searches have been upheld when an
experienced officer, taking the nature of the crime into account, normally and
logically would expect to find items associated with that crime at the place
to be searched.
The most telling feature of this dissent is not Judge Barbera’s conclusion
but her opening. She begins by observing that, unlike several other
jurisdictions that have “rejected the good faith exception as incompatible
with those states’ constitutions,” the Court of Appeals has not even
“recognized an exclusionary rule for evidence seized in violation of Article
26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” 44 Indeed, this is so even though
dissenting judges in other cases have urged that course. 45 Without its own
exclusionary rule, the Court of Appeals has not had to face whether to adopt
its own good faith exception, with exceptions to the exception, or to reject
the good faith doctrine entirely. Instead of providing increased protections
against execution of improperly issued warrants, beyond those afforded by
the Fourth Amendment, the Court has interpreted Article 26 in lockstep with
the Fourth Amendment:
Unless and until this Court recognizes an Article 26-based
exclusionary rule and disclaims any exception for “good faith”
42. Patterson v. State, 401 Md. 76, 104, 930 A.2d 348, 365 (2007) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at
923).
43. Agurs, 415 Md. at 108, 998 A.2d at 895 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 926) (Barbera, J.
dissenting) (joined by Adkins, J.).
44. Id. at 102, 998 A.2d at 891–92.
45. Id.
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violations of that state constitutional provision, I feel bound to
follow the good faith doctrine as explicated and applied in Leon,
Sheppard, and the cases that have applied that doctrine in
Maryland. Faithful application of those cases, in my view,
compels the conclusion that the police acted in good faith when
they searched [Agur’s] home pursuant to the search warrant. 46
The primary message from Judge Barbera in this dissent is that when a
change to the law is needed and can be accomplished on independent state
grounds, that is the route that should be taken to bring it about. It should not
be brought about by deviating without principle from the application of
existing law. 47
Besides Carter, two of Chief Judge Barbera’s most fruitful non-majority
opinions, one in dissent and one in concurrence, address how advances in
hard science and social science fit in with and affect the development of
established legal concepts.
In 2003, the General Assembly enacted the Maryland DNA Collection
Act, which, among other things, permits certain law enforcement officers to
compel those arrested for crimes of violence and other specified dangerous
crimes to furnish DNA samples by cheek swab. 48 After arraignment, when
probable cause is established, the DNA is entered into the Combined DNA
Index System (CODIS). In King v. State, 49 King was charged with rape based
on a CODIS DNA match. In a previous arrest for a crime of violence, his
46. Id. at 103, 998 A.2d at 892.
47. In two criminal procedure cases, Chief Judge Barbera dissented to express her view that the
majority simply had misapplied established federal constitutional standards. In State v. Baker, 453
Md. 32, 160 A.3d 559 (2017), the majority held that the declaration of a mistrial was not supported
by manifest necessity, barring retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
It criticized the trial court for not having articulated all the reasonable alternatives to a mistrial and
the ground for rejecting each one. Chief Judge Barbera disagreed that some alternatives the majority
had posited with the benefit of retrospect were reasonable and argued that “although consideration
of reasonable alternatives is part of the manifest necessity determination, a trial judge’s failure to
exhaust and dictate on the record all of those alternatives, and its reasons for rejecting each
alternative, should not render the declaration of a mistrial an abuse of discretion.” Baker, 453 Md.
at 67, 160 A.3d at 579 (Barbera, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Adkins, J.). She pointed out that neither
the United States Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals ever had required such an express finding.
Id.
In Brown v. State, 452 Md. 196, 156 A.3d 839 (2017), the majority held that the defendant was
in custody for purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), when he was transported from
the hospital to the station house and interrogated in connection with a shooting. It affirmed the
circuit court’s order suppressing the statement the defendant gave before being given Miranda
warnings. Chief Judge Barbera took issue with how the majority applied the totality of the
circumstances standard to determine whether the defendant would have felt free to leave;
specifically, she included in her recitation of events facts the majority had omitted that weighed in
favor of the defendant’s knowing he was free to leave. Brown, 452 Md. at 223–24, 156 A.3d at
854–55 (Barbera, C.J., dissenting) (joined by McDonald, J.).
48. MD. CODE § 2-504(a)(3) (2009).
49. 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 549 (2012) (Barbera, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Wilner, J. (retired)).
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DNA was obtained and, upon being entered in CODIS, matched the DNA for
the unsolved rape. King challenged the admission of the DNA match in the
rape case, arguing, unsuccessfully, that the DNA Collection Act allowed
unreasonable warrantless searches of arrestees, in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. He was convicted and appealed, and the case reached the Court
of Appeals.
The majority agreed with King. It held that the cheek swab was a search
of King’s body, performed without a warrant, when King only was an
arrestee. Analyzing the totality of the circumstances by balancing King’s
privacy interests against the legitimate interests of the State served by the
search, the majority concluded that the DNA search was unreasonable, and
therefore violated the Fourth Amendment.
Then-Judge Barbera agreed that a cheek swab is a search of the person,
although a minor one, and that it was performed on King without a warrant.
She also agreed that whether the warrantless search, as permitted by the DNA
Collection Act, violated the Fourth Amendment properly should be
determined under the traditional totality of the circumstances test for
reasonableness. She disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the search
was unreasonable under that test. Concerning individual privacy, she
detailed the many procedures arrestees already are subject to that are more
intrusive than a cheek swab and explained that the limited nature of the DNA
profile entered in CODIS, which does not reveal any personal traits or
propensities of the arrestee, offers protection from misuse. On the other
hand, she explained, the government has an interest in using DNA to most
reliably identify the arrestee and to solve crimes and exonerate those who
may have been convicted of crimes they did not commit. In her assessment,
the privacy interest of a person arrested for a serious crime in being free from
a minimal bodily invasion is outweighed by the government’s interest in
using a barely intrusive search to obtain the most up-to-date and trustworthy
scientific identification evidence, and therefore the cheek swab search was
reasonable.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in King, and in an opinion
authored by Justice Kennedy that employed much the same reasoning as
Judge Barbera, reversed. 50 In doing so, it resolved a split in federal and state
court decisions “as to whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits the collection
and analysis of a DNA sample from persons arrested, but not yet convicted,
on felony charges.” 51

50. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013). Justice Kennedy was joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, and Breyer. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.
51. Id. at 442.
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In 2019, Chief Judge Barbera authored a concurring opinion in Small v.
State 52 on the issue of out-of-court eyewitness identifications of defendants.
Starting in 2021, that opinion will have a significant impact on how juries
assess such evidence.
The question before the Court in Small was whether an out-of-court
identification of the defendant by the crime victim passed muster under
federal due process grounds. The perpetrator, a male, attempted to rob and
then shot the victim in the early morning hours at a bus stop. The victim
included in his description of the assailant that he had a distinctive neck tattoo
containing multiple letters, at least one of which was an “M.” The police
showed the victim two photographic arrays. In the first, Small was one of
the six men depicted and the only one with a neck tattoo. The victim said
Small’s picture looked like his assailant, but he did not think it was him. In
the second, all the men had neck tattoos. Small’s picture was included and
of course was the only one in the second array that also had been in the first
array. In response to viewing Small’s picture in the second array, the victim
said, “That’s him. That’s who shot me.” 53
The circuit court ruled that the first photographic array was inadmissible
but the second was not. A jury convicted Small of the crimes charged. The
case reached the Court of Appeals. In deciding whether the photographic
identification of Small satisfied federal due process standards, 54 a majority
applied the reliability factors established by the Supreme Court in Neil v.
Biggers 55 and Manson v. Braithwaite, 56 and adopted in Maryland in Jones v.
State. 57 It concluded that the second array identification was unnecessarily
suggestive but was admissible because the “indicia of reliability [were]
strong enough to outweigh the corrupting effect of the police-arranged
suggestive circumstances.” 58
Although Chief Judge Barbera agreed with the outcome within the due
process framework the majority employed, she concurred to express
disappointment that the Court had not seized the opportunity to expand that
52. 464 Md. 68, 211 A.3d 236 (2019) (Barbera, C.J., concurring) (joined by Adkins and
McDonald, JJ.).
53. Id. at 79, 211 A.3d at 242.
54. When an extrajudicial identification of a defendant is conducted by law enforcement, the
identification will not satisfy due process if the procedure used was unnecessarily suggestive and
rendered the results not reliable. Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 235 (2012).
55. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
56. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
57. 310 Md. 569, 530 A.2d 743 (1987), vacated on other grounds, Jones v. Maryland, 486 U.S.
1050 (1988).
58. Small, 464 Md. at 93, 211 A.3d at 250 (quoting Perry, 565 U.S. at 232). There was
additional evidence, beyond the second photographic array, that supported the reliability of the
victim’s identification of Small, including that the victim previously had encountered Small at the
victim’s job and recognized his voice.
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framework for pre-trial assessment of reliability of extrajudicial
identifications of a defendant beyond the Biggers/Manson/Jones factors. She
lamented the Court’s failure to consider and act on the far-reaching social
science advances in the areas of human perception and memory that have
“expose[d] the frailty of the Manson factors for eyewitness identification
reliability” and have revealed that faulty eyewitness identifications are “the
single greatest cause of wrongful convictions in this country.” 59
Chief Judge Barbera recommended that the Court follow the lead of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in New Jersey v. Henderson, 60 which developed
an assessment framework based on factors it categorized as “system” and
“estimator” variables. The former are factors in the State’s control and are
geared toward how identification processes are assembled and administered.
The latter are factors that usually relate to the incident, such as the weather
and how long the witness had to observe what was happening; the
eyewitness, such as intoxication, stress, or vision problems; or the
perpetrator, such as whether the identification was cross-racial or whether the
perpetrator wore a disguise, mask, or changed his appearance. As Chief
Judge Barbera explained, the Henderson court also directed that jurors be
informed about counterintuitive factors jurors will think correlate with
accurate identifications but actually do not; adopted a new pretrial procedure
for courts to use in evaluating the suggestiveness and reliability of out-ofcourt identifications, using system and estimator variables; and permitted
expert testimony about the effect of certain variables on memory, so long as
opinions are not offered on credibility of particular witnesses.
Ever mindful of the role of stare decisis, Chief Judge Barbera opined
that, even though, four years earlier, the Court had “declined a similar
invitation to adopt the Henderson ‘theories and methodologies,’” finding the
Biggers/Manson/Jones factors satisfactory, it was time for the Court, going
forward, to revise its jurisprudence in this area to comport with scientific
advancements in the understanding of memory and perception. 61 She closed
her concurring opinion as follows:
There is no reason Maryland cannot commit to a new framework.
A variety of solutions could help Maryland courts, in ruling on a
suppression motion, avoid the “primary evil” of “a very substantial
likelihood of irreparable misidentification,” and help jurors better
determine the weight to be accorded to an identification offered at
trial. For those purposes, I suggest that this Court direct the Rules
59. Id. at 105–06, 211 A.3d at 257–58 (Barbera, C.J., concurring) (joined by Adkins and
McDonald, JJ.).
60. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
61. Small, 464 Md. at 115–16, 211 A.3d at 263–64 (Barbera, C.J., concurring) (joined by
Adkins and McDonald, JJ.).
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Committee to craft and propose rules of procedure that bring
scientific rigor to the assessment of an eyewitness identification
that a defendant has challenged as unduly suggestive and,
ultimately, unreliable. To that end, worthy of consideration is the
Henderson court’s new four-part procedure for evaluating
suggestiveness and reliability. I also endorse the concept of
leaving “to the trial court the decision whether to allow expert
testimony in an individual case.” Likewise, I suggest that this
Court ask the Criminal Subcommittee of the Standing Committee
on Maryland Pattern Jury Instructions to create a pattern jury
instruction for use in the appropriate case, to better guide jurors. I
await the day—which cannot come too soon—when this Court,
prompted by the research on potential fallibility of eyewitness
identification evidence, takes meaningful steps to improve
Maryland’s pretrial and trial-related procedures, so as to mitigate,
if not eliminate, the present concerns that attend the admission of,
and weight given to, such evidence in future cases. 62
For its part, the MSBA Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee
took up the challenge. After much discussion and debate, the members
crafted a revised MPJI-Cr 3:30, “Identification of Defendant.” The new
instruction incorporates many of the Henderson variables as factors to be
considered by jurors assessing the accuracy and reliability of an out-of-court
identification of the defendant.
Considering specific weaknesses in the Biggers/Manson/Jones factors
Chief Judge Barbera focused on in her concurrence, two changes are most
noteworthy. First, the revised instruction includes language cautioning jurors
that just because a witness is certain of his or her identification, that does not
mean the identification is reliable. “Certainty may or may not be a reliable
indicator of accuracy. A person, in good faith, may be confident but
mistaken.” 63 And second, it affords jurors guidance about cross-racial
identifications, for use when the defendant and the identifying witness are of
different races:
Some people have greater difficulty accurately identifying people
of a different race than people of their own race. You should
consider whether the difference in race between the defendant and
the identifying witness affected the accuracy of the witness’s
identification [taking into account the witness’ background and
experience]. 64

62. Id. at 117, 211 A.3d at 264–65 (internal citations omitted).
63. MPJI-Cr 3:30 (5).
64. Id. at (8). The last phrase is bracketed for use when there has been evidence that the witness
has had background and experience relevant to cross-racial identification.
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The amended “Identification of Defendant” instruction became effective on
July 1, 2021.
While a member of the Court of Appeals, and especially since becoming
Chief Judge in 2013, Chief Judge Barbera has left her mark on the Maryland
Judiciary in ways others will give tribute to, many of which are not related to
her published words in the “beige books.” However, her words, especially
those written to express a difference of opinion, show the workings of a
judicious mind aiming at substantial justice, and themselves have made a
difference.

A TRIBUTE TO THE HONORABLE MARY ELLEN BARBERA
CLAYTON GREENE, JR ∗
Mary Ellen Barbera and I were appointed to the Court of Special
Appeals, the state’s second-highest court in 2002. I was elevated to the Court
of Appeals in 2004, to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of the
Honorable John C. Eldridge. In 2008, Judge Barbera was elevated to the
Court of Appeals to fill the vacancy created by the retirement of the
Honorable Irma Raker. Thus, Judge Barbera and I were colleagues on the
Court of Special Appeals for two years and for eleven years on the Court of
Appeals prior to my retirement in 2019. The record reveals that during our
respective terms of court, we agreed more than we disagreed about the law
and its application to the many cases that came before our Court for
resolution.
Mary Ellen Barbera is a treasured colleague and educator who is
forthright, gracious, industrious, warm-hearted, and friendly. Notably, she is
the first woman in the history of the Maryland Judiciary to be appointed Chief
Judge of the Maryland Court of Appeals. Given her many duties as Chief
Judge and the enormous amount of reading that is required of appellate
judges, Chief Judge Barbera is an adroit leader in striking the proper balance
between her required reading assignments and focusing on other matters of
interest. She maintains considerable respect for the welfare of others and for
comradery and laughter among our colleagues and law clerks as
demonstrated by our annual end of term of court “get together with the law
clerks for lunch and bowling” designed to celebrate their contributions to the
work of the Court of Appeals.
Mary Ellen Barbera, as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, and not as
a bowler, demonstrates regularly her considerable talents as a jurist,
administrator, and trailblazer in that she is not afraid to challenge the status
quo; emphasizing that the way we have always done it (tradition) is not
necessarily the way we are going to do it (going forward). One of the first
policy changes implemented during her administration as Chief Judge was to
establish a uniform deadline, with the unanimous consent of the Court, to file
our written opinions with the Clerk of the Court no later than the end of the
term of court in which the case was argued. This change in policy clearly
has enhanced the public’s perception of the work of the Court.
© 2021 Clayton Greene, Jr.
∗
Judge Greene retired from the Court of Appeals of Maryland effective July 1, 2019.
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MEL, as she is affectionately known, probably would not describe
herself as a trailblazer. She is far too modest. Instead, she would find a way
to compliment others. I believe her focus would not be on herself as chief
judge and administrator, but on the “the trailblazers who cleared a path for
[our] generation.” 1 The Chief has said that she wants to be remembered as
“someone who furthered the rule of law and increased access to justice for
everyone.” 2
In June 2020, Chief Judge Barbera wrote that “[t]he [mass] protests of
the last several weeks have coalesced into a truth that cannot be ignored:
people of color are being denied their rightful equality.” 3 She reminded us
of our collective responsibility, particularly as judges, “to make the
guarantees embodied in [the Constitutions of the United States and
Maryland] a reality for all people.” 4 She urged that judges reexamine how
we administer justice and “determine, along with the other branches of
government, how to ensure that the protections and rights under law are
afforded equally to all of us.” 5 The Chief emphasized that “[w]e must assure
that our courts do not suffer bias, conscious or unconscious. We must
examine, together, the reasons for disproportionate impact upon people of
color, and address those reasons.” 6
Chief Judge Barbera has inspired and challenged us. She said:
In Maryland, we have begun to address some of the systemic inequities
that affect the poor and people of color more often and with greater detriment.
We have begun pretrial reform, but still need pretrial services state-wide to
eliminate the pretrial detention of those who do not pose a risk, but cannot
afford even a low monetary bail. We have instituted mediation in landlordtenant cases, but we need to address the manner in which the hundreds of
thousands of landlord-tenant matters are filed and administered each year.
We are working to improve the justice responses to children involved
with the courts. But we do still need to better address the problems of our
young, our children, who have grown up in violence and poverty, far too
many of whom are of color. We must recognize that their suffering is our
suffering and their desperation, ours. As long as they are not afforded the
stability and opportunity that all children deserve and require, we risk our
collective stability as a state and as a nation.
1. Gina Galluci-White, Hon. Mary Ellen Barbera, DAILY REC. (Nov. 8, 2018),
https://thedailyrecord.com/2018/11/08/trailblazers-hon-mary-ellen-barbera/.
2. Id.
3. Statement from Mary Ellen Barbera, C.J., Ct. Appeals Md., Statement on Equal Justice
Under
Law
1
(June
9,
2020),
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/coappeals/pdfs/statementonequaljustice060920.pdf.
4. Id. at 1–2.
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id.
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We have been fortunate in Maryland to have had a longstanding
commitment to a judiciary that looks like the people it serves—and an equal
commitment to access to justice. We must, however, recognize the economic
and racial disparities that persist in our justice system. We cannot eliminate
them until we make certain that all voices are heard and respected and that
the perspectives and experience of all realign our practices to make good the
promise of equal justice under law. 7
In another respect, looking forward, Chief Judge Barbera has been in
the forefront of the movement to change the name of the appellate courts and
the judges of those courts. In the interest of clarity and consistency with the
overwhelming majority of other states, the Chief worked diligently to initiate
renaming the Court of Appeals and the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland. The Court of Appeals would be designated as the Supreme Court
of Maryland and the Court of Special Appeals would be designated as the
Court of Appeals. 8 Under this change the judges of the Supreme Court would
be identified as justices of the Court and judges of the Court of Appeals
would be identified as judges of that Court. The heads of the respective
appellate courts would be identified as Chief Justice and Chief Judge,
respectively.
Chief Judge Barbera has also challenged the status quo in several of her
opinions, notably, her concurring opinion in Small v. State. 9 I authored the
majority opinion for the Court in Small. In that case, a victim had described
his attacker as having the letter “M” tattooed on his neck; the victim was
shown a photo array in which the suspect was the only person who had a
visible tattoo on his neck. 10 The Court held that the visible tattoo served to
emphasize the suspect’s photograph as compared to the other photos, and, in
conjunction with the fact that the suspect’s photo was the only one repeated
in a second photo array, law enforcement impermissibly suggested to the
victim that he should identify the suspect’s photo. 11 To reach its conclusion,
the Court applied the framework for assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identification as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Manson v.

7. Id. at 2–3.
8. On April 6, 2021, the Maryland General Assembly passed HB 885 proposing an
Amendment to the Constitution to change the names of the Maryland appellate courts and to change
the name of a Judge of the Court of Appeals to be a Justice of the Supreme Court of Maryland. The
proposed Amendment will be on the November 2022 ballot. H.B. 885, 2021 Leg., 442d Sess. (Md.
2021). Also, during Chief Judge Barbera’s administration, the State Law Library was renamed as
Thurgood Marshall State Law Library in Honor of Justice Thurgood Marshall. S.B. 594, 2019 Leg.,
440th Sess. (Md. 2019).
9. 464 Md. 68, 102, 211 A.3d 236, 256 (2019) (Barbera, C.J., concurring) (advocating for
courts to change how we handle the admission of eyewitness identification evidence).
10. Id. at 91, 211 A.3d at 249.
11. Id. at 91–92, 211 A.3d at 249.
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Brathwaite, 12 and adopted by the Court of Appeals in Jones v. State. 13 The
majority also acknowledged and clarified that the five Biggers reliability
factors, in conjunction with the additional factors identified in
Henderson 14—many of which overlap with the Biggers factors—may be
considered by the suppression court in assessing the totality of the
circumstances when identification procedures are challenged.15
Chief Judge Barbera, in her concurring opinion, agreed that the Court
had correctly applied the current law to the facts of the case. 16 Yet, her
challenge was to the Court’s failure to seize the opportunity to join those state
supreme courts that embraced a far more comprehensive list of
suggestiveness and reliability factors than that devised by the United States
Supreme Court. 17 The Chief advocated for the Court to adopt the Henderson
court procedure for evaluating suggestiveness and reliability by
Believing that the targeted
incorporating additional variables. 18
consideration of new variables and a new four-part inquiry would ameliorate
the shortcomings of the Manson framework, Chief Judge Barbera contended
that Maryland should adopt a new framework to “help jurors better determine
the weight to be accorded to an identification offered at trial.” 19 The Chief
relied upon research studies that indicated “that, despite an eyewitness’s
belief that his or her identification is accurate, there is no statistically
significant correlation between certainty and accuracy.” 20 In addition, she
took into consideration that the Manson test “treats factors such as the
confidence of a witness as independent markers of reliability when, in fact, it
is now well established that confidence judgments may vary over time and
can be powerfully swayed by many factors.” 21 Ultimately, the Chief called
for development of a “more rigorous protocol for assessing eyewitness
identification reliability in Maryland.” 22 To that end, in her concurrence, she
asked the “Court [to] direct the Rules Committee to craft and propose rules
of procedure that bring scientific rigor to the assessment of an eyewitness
identification that a defendant has challenged as unduly suggestive and,

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

432 U.S. 98 (1977).
310 Md. 569, 530 A.2d 743 (1987).
27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
Small, 464 Md. at 87, 211 A.3d at 246–47.
Id. at 103, 211 A.3d at 256.
Id.
Id. at 108–09, 211 A.3d at 259–60.
Id. at 117, 211 A.3d at 264.
Id. at 109, 211 A.3d at 260.
Id. (quoting NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., IDENTIFYING THE CULPRIT:
ASSESSING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 6 (2014)).
22. Id. at 114, 211 A.3d at 263.
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ultimately, unreliable,” in addition to other modification of procedures. 23
The Small concurring opinion is only one of Chief Judge Barbera’s efforts to
point the Court in another direction.
Chief Judge Barbera’s contributions to the law and its development are
monumental. Others will speak to them in their submissions on the occasion
of the Chief’s retirement. In my view, she is a jurist who has graced the Court
of Appeals and the legal community with charm and commitment to
meaningful change to promote fairness and justice under the law. I am
thankful for Mary Ellen Barbera’s tenure as Chief Judge in our State and for
being a wonderful colleague and friend. We have all benefitted from her
warm presence and meticulous leadership of the judiciary as she has
embraced the relevant science and changed and clarified principles of law
and policies of the Court, always “striv[ing] to take the good and make it
better.” 24

23. Id. at 117, 211 A.3d at 264.
24. Gina Galluci-White, Hon. Mary Ellen Barbera, DAILY REC. (NOV. 8, 2018),
https://thedailyrecord.com/2018/11/08/trailblazers-hon-mary-ellen-barbera/.

A TRIBUTE TO THE HONORABLE MARY ELLEN BARBERA
BRIAN E. FROSH ∗
When asked when there would be enough women on the Supreme
Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously responded: “When there are nine. For
most of the country’s existence, there were nine of the same sex and they
were all men, and nobody thought that that was out of order.” 1
Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera has the historic distinction of being the
first woman to serve as Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals of Maryland and
the first person to preside over a Court of Appeals with a female majority
(four women, three men). In a country where women represent over half of
the population and for decades have made up more than half of law school
students, these were important historic firsts.
Her historic milestone is an important part—but just the starting point—
of Mary Ellen Barbera’s legacy as Chief Judge. She has cemented her legacy
with a long and impressive list of accomplishments as head of Maryland’s
judiciary. I want to focus here on two aspects of her service: the experience
of the Assistant Attorneys General in my office with the Chief Judge, and the
Chief Judge’s dedication to promoting access to justice and equal justice for
those impacted by Maryland’s court system.
Since Chief Judge Barbera’s 2008 appointment to the Court of Appeals,
attorneys in my office have appeared before her in hundreds of cases.
Because the Office of the Attorney General handles all criminal appeals for
State’s Attorneys across the State, our Assistant Attorneys General are
“frequent fliers” in the Court of Appeals, usually appearing for oral argument
in at least one criminal appeal on every day the Court sits.
Apparent to the Assistant Attorneys General appearing before her is
Chief Judge Barbera’s love of appellate law. The Court under her leadership
allowed for passionate advocacy, while keeping the focus where it should be
in appellate proceedings, on precise legal analysis and the appropriate
direction of Maryland law. As an alumna of the OAG Criminal Appeals
Division herself, Chief Judge Barbera is a subject-matter expert on criminal
law. She was always prepared with questions that cut to the heart of the
matter, and certainly tested the mettle of the advocates who appeared before
her. Yet she did so with unfailing courtesy and civility to attorneys appearing
 2021 Brian E. Frosh.
∗
Maryland Attorney General.
1. ABA, Justice Ginsburg Envisions a High Court of Nine Women Justices (May 1, 2013),
https://abanow.org/2013/05/justice-ginsburg-envisions-a-high-court-of-nine-women-justices/.
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before her and to her colleagues. Any trepidation at appearing before her
flowed from the knowledge that one needed to be fully prepared for her
questioning; it was never a fear of tongue-lashing or a personal attack, which
were simply absent from her repertoire.
Chief Judge Barbera’s collegiality and good humor also left a lasting
impression on the attorneys in my office. When the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Maryland v. King, 2 then-Judge Barbera, who wrote the Court of
Appeals’ dissenting opinion, traveled to Washington, D.C., to watch the oral
argument in the Supreme Court with Judge Harrell, who wrote the majority
opinion for the Court of Appeals. For the Assistant Attorneys General who
worked on the case, the sight of the two judges sitting side-by-side, enjoying
one another’s company and the grandeur of appellate argument in the
nation’s highest court, sent a powerful signal about collegiality, friendship,
and respect.
When an Assistant Attorney General retired after serving in the
Criminal Appeals Division for nearly three decades, Chief Judge Barbera
delighted in watching members of the Division pour into the courtroom to
surprise her by attending her last argument. When the argument concluded,
she gave the attorney a fond farewell from the bench that served as a
memorable capstone to her career.
Chief Judge Barbera’s legacy also includes her commitment to equality
and justice. Under her leadership, the Maryland Judiciary created the Access
to Justice Department to focus on supporting access to the courts for the selfrepresented. One important pillar of this effort is the judiciary’s self-help
centers, which serve more than 80,000 citizens annually. 3
Chief Judge Barbera also took on the important issue of juveniles being
shackled while appearing in courtrooms. Finding, among other things, that
“placing children in shackles can be traumatizing and contrary to the
developmentally appropriate approach to juvenile justice,” the judiciary
under her leadership adopted as policy “the presumption against the
shackling of children during proceedings in the Juvenile Court” and ordered
that a child in the court or hearing room “is to be unshackled and remain so
absent a particularized security concern.” 4
While she fiercely respected the walls that must exist between judges
and parties in cases, she always understood that others have important input
2. 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
3. MD. JUDICIARY, RESOURCES FOR SELF-REPRESENTED LITIGANTS IN THE MARYLAND
COURTS
23
(2017),
https://mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/accesstojustice/pdfs/fy17srlreport.pdf.
4. RESOLUTION REGARDING SHACKLING OF CHILDREN IN JUVENILE COURT (Sept. 21, 2015),
https://www.mdcourts.gov/sites/default/files/import/judicialcouncil/pdfs/resolutionregardingshack
ling20150921.pdf.
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into the judicial system and the need to make sure its practices live up to the
ideal we all share: “equal justice under law.” 5 On these broader, systemic
issues, she would always take my call, listen, question, and take action when
she deemed it warranted.
Nowhere was her dedication to equal justice more apparent than in her
actions to reform how bail is set in criminal cases. Decisions about who is
released pending trial should be based on whether the person is a flight risk
and/or a risk to the community—not on one’s ability to pay. Nonetheless,
hundreds of low-risk individuals were detained each day in Maryland jails
because they were poor. In addition to being fundamentally unfair and of
questionable constitutionality, the practice was costly and disproportionately
impacted people of color, particularly Black people.
Chief Judge Barbera led the Court of Appeals in adopting a rule in 2017
to change this practice. Maryland Rule 4-216.1 makes clear both that
“preference should be given to additional conditions without financial
terms” and that “[a] judicial officer may not impose a special condition of
release with financial terms in form or amount that results in the pretrial
detention of the defendant solely because the defendant is financially
incapable of meeting that condition.” 6
Bail reform was a controversial and politically charged issue. The
hearings before the Rules Committee and before the Court of Appeals
included testimony from numerous witnesses including a former United
States Solicitor General on one side and a former United States Attorney
General on the other. Questions from the Court were pointed and incisive.
It seemed clear that the Court was sharply divided.
Chief Judge Barbera adjourned the hearing before the Court took final
action on the proposed rule. When it re-convened, modest amendments to
the proposed rule were proposed and adopted. Then, the Court adopted the
rule unanimously. The result was a clear measure of Chief Judge Barbera’s
skills as a bridge builder and as a leader.
As a follow-up to that rule change, Chief Judge Barbera organized
training sessions for the judiciary and a statewide pretrial forum. She
emphasized to the judiciary and to county officials the need for pretrial
services, an essential component of any fair pretrial system that does not rely
primarily on incarceration.
In the view of the Office of the Attorney General, the rule on bail reform
was a watershed moment for criminal justice in Maryland. Jail populations
dropped significantly. More work remains, but the rule, as it has been
5. Statement from Mary Ellen Barbera, Chief Judge, Ct. Appeals Md., Statement on Equal
Justice Under Law 2 (June 9, 2020).
6. MD. RULES tit. 4, § 216.1 (2021).
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applied, has already freed thousands of people to work, study and care for
their families while they await trial. It has saved state and local governments
millions of dollars, and there is no evidence that the rule has led to increases
in the failure to appear rate or to crimes committed by individuals on pretrial
release.
Socrates said: “Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously; to
answer wisely; to consider soberly; and to decide impartially.” Chief Judge
Barbera has exemplified those Socratic ideals throughout her career. To use
her own words, she well understood that “it is the happenstance of birth that
can give us opportunities or not.” 7 She also understood that “equal justice
under law” is more than a motto—it’s an ideal that requires our constant
attention and work. For that, and so many other things, we applaud her
service.

7. Andrea F. Siegel & Erin Cox, Maryland’s New Chief Judge Lauded as Forthright,
Diplomatic, BALT. SUN (July 3, 2013), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/bs-xpm-2013-0703-bs-md-barbera-20130701-story.html.

AN IRREGULAR ODE TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY ELLEN
BARBERA
GLENN T. HARRELL, JR. ∗
I admit to a healthy bias regarding Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera. I
love her like Gale Sayers loved Brian Piccolo. 1 It is a purely Arthurian love,
like Lancelot for King Arthur (not like Lancelot’s love for Queen Guinevere).
It is a consequence of the time we spent together toiling in judicial vineyards.
I think our paths intersected meaningfully for the first time in 19992
when she was Deputy Legal Counsel to Governor Glendening, and I was a
shortlisted candidate to fill a vacancy on the Court of Appeals. 3 The duties
of the Office of Legal Counsel included sitting in on the Governor’s
interviews of judicial candidates and advising the Governor in the course of
his post-interview deliberations. Frankly, I cannot recall whether she or
Andrea Leahy, who was then Chief Legal Counsel, 4 sat in on my interview,
but I am pretty sure she participated in the deliberations. My thanks to her
are long overdue, even though she takes no credit for the outcome.
Chief Judge Barbera and I served together on the Court of Appeals from
2008 until I confronted in 2015 the same constitutional retirement she
confronted in September of 2021. I acted as the Court’s Senior Judge for
internal court administration and, thus, as her surrogate. I think that I have,
therefore, a sound basis from which to offer the views expressed in this
tribute.
I have not served with a more collegial colleague over my thirty years
as a judge. She is patient with her colleagues, attorneys, and court staff. She
listens respectfully while you speak (abstaining from talking over you) and
asks questions in an even and neutral tone. She laughs easily. Fairness in
assigning opinion responsibilities is another of her hallmarks (which she
shares with her predecessor, Chief Judge Robert M. Bell). Of some
significance also, she never takes a victory lap when her opinion in a case
© 2021 Glenn T. Harrell.
*
Judge (Ret.), Court of Appeals of Maryland & Maryland Court of Special Appeals.
1. BRIAN’S SONG (Columbia Pictures 1971).
2. A case may be made that she, while Deputy Chief of the Criminal Appeals Division of the
Maryland Attorney General’s Office (1989–98), appeared before me while I served on the Court of
Special Appeals (1991–99); however, I am too lazy at present to perform the research necessary to
confirm that.
3. Governor Glendening appointed me to that office on 17 August 1999.
4. She was appointed later to the Court of Special Appeals but was transitioning at that time
to a position within a law firm.
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prevails ultimately over your opinion. I can offer an example from personal
experience illustrating a number of these traits.
The case is King v. State. 5 It arose from the State’s collection of a DNA
specimen from an arrestee, which the State used to connect the arrestee to an
unrelated “cold case” committed years before King’s arrest. King mounted
a Fourth Amendment challenge. I wrote, for five judges of the Court, the
majority opinion disapproving of the State’s acquisition and use of the DNA.
Judge Barbera wrote, for the remaining two members of the Court, a cogent,
and almost as persuasive, dissent.
The State sought certiorari review by the U.S. Supreme Court. It was
granted. 6 Oral argument was scheduled for 26 February 2013. Judge Barbera
organized a field trip, together with our law clerks, to attend oral argument
and lunch afterward at The Monocle Restaurant near the Court. Joining us at
lunch was Jess Bravin, a Supreme Court journalist for The Wall Street
Journal (“WSJ”). From some undisclosed source, he heard of our trip and
wanted to write an article on appellate collegiality between judges holding
opposing views in an important case. His article was published on 15 April
2013, in the print version of the WSJ, accompanied by a “lovey-dovey”
photograph of Chief Judge Barbera and me, posed in our red robes in our
Annapolis courtroom, laughing and talking, and a photograph of the
boisterous lunch at The Monocle. The formal photo was captioned
“Maryland Court of Appeals Judges Mary Ellen Barbera and Glenn Harrell
remain friends despite disagreeing on a case before the Supreme Court.” 7
This is how it is supposed to be.
On 13 June 2013, the Supreme Court filed its opinion overruling, by a
five-to-four vote, my opinion for the Court of Appeals as well as approving
of Judge Barbera’s jurisprudence. 8 She barely raised an eyebrow at me and
never initiated conversation about the outcome. I was the one who raised the
topic, usually crying over the spilled milk of having failed to capture Justice
Breyer with my reasoning. Yet, she remained chivalrous.
Chief Judge Barbera, as a law-giver, is highly principled and mindful
that the Court be perceived in the same light by the bar and public. The best
example of this trait that comes to mind involves the case of State v. Waine. 9
Waine presented an opportunity for a newly-configured Court to overrule a
hotly-debated earlier decision in Unger v. State. I dissented in part in Unger,
5. 425 Md. 550, 42 A.3d 549 (2012), rev’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
6. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
7. See Jess Bravin, Maryland Judge Finds Tables Turned, WALL ST. J.,
https://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323820304578411163911956102.html (Apr. 15,
2013, 3:45 PM ET).
8. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965–66.
9. 444 Md. 692, 122 A.3d 294 (2015).
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together with Judge Adkins. Chief Judge Barbera did not sit on Unger.
Following Unger, three of the judges in the Unger majority departed the
Court and had been replaced by the time Waine reached the Court. Thus, the
holdover Unger judges were split 2-2, leaving the previously uncommitted
new judges “up for grabs” vis-à-vis the State’s patent objective to overrule
Unger. Anticipating the possibility that I was a likely candidate to mount a
campaign to attempt to sway the “new” Court to reject Unger, Chief Judge
Barbera engaged me in a dialogue about the principles of the doctrine of stare
decisis. I had claimed in my Unger dissent that the Unger majority paid mere
lip service to stare decisis in overruling an earlier decision (of mine) in State
v. Adams. 10 She convinced me that stare decisis—notwithstanding whether
it may have been abused in Unger—if applied properly in Waine, compelled
rejection of the State’s offer to turn back the clock to overrule a debatably
wrongly decided case. In short, she persuaded me to honor the rule of law
and put aside my ideologic (sour grapes?) and pragmatic preferences.
Speaking further to the care and maintenance of the Court’s reputation
before the bar and public, Chief Judge Barbera demonstrated her sensitivity
to that objective shortly after her appointment as Chief. She declared a policy
that the Court would decide every case argued in a term within that term,
absent extenuating circumstances. This remedial proclamation was needed
because the Court had been called out in a series of articles in The Daily
Record for an unacceptable tardiness in deciding a number of cases.11
Although the Court caught up its opinion backlog before she became Chief
Judge, her attention to the promotion of the public trust and confidence in the
Court offered a commitment not to repeat what had occurred previously. 12
A smile spreads over my face every time the Chief, usually when
engaged in public speaking, lapses into what I call her “schoolmarm”
persona. By “schoolmarm,” I mean benevolently a born-and-bred teacher
who adopts a relentlessly cheerful demeanor in the delivery of the day’s
lesson. This comes as no surprise because she taught in the Baltimore City
public schools before attending law school and taught at the American
University Washington College of Law (1993–2017) and at the University of
Baltimore School of Law (1987–90, 1993–98). It appears that she subscribes,

10. 406 Md. 240, 958 A.2d 295 (2008); see also Unger, 427 Md. at 417, 48 A.3d at 261–62
(discussing the application of stare decisis to this case).
11. See, e.g., Ed. Advisory Bd., Md. High Court Decisions Too Long in Coming, DAILY REC.
(Aug. 21, 2011), https://thedailyrecord.com/2011/08/21/editorial-advisory-board-md-high-courtdecisions-too-long-in-coming/.
12. Her leadership was also stellar in overseeing the ongoing implementation of MDEC
(Maryland Electronic Courts, our statewide paperless filing initiative), the resumption of annual
statewide judicial conferences, and adjusting court operations during the COVID-19 pandemic.
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as a pedagogical principle, to the aphorism that “a spoonful of sugar helps
the medicine go down.” 13
I agree completely with the praise heaped on the Chief in the other
tributes appearing here. I conclude simply with the gist of a song by the
singer James Taylor 14—in Mary Ellen Barbera, the bench, bar, and public
have a friend.

13. MARY POPPINS (Walt Disney Prod. 1964).
14. James Taylor, You’ve Got a Friend, on MUD SLIDE SLIM AND THE BLUE HORIZON (Warner
Bros. 1971).

TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY ELLEN BARBERA: A LAW
CLERK’S PERSPECTIVE
REBECCA W. FOREMAN, ESQ. *
Over the course of Chief Judge Barbera’s nineteen years as a judge on
Maryland’s appellate courts, dozens of lawyers have had the good fortune of
serving as her law clerk. I was one of those lucky lawyers to obtain a
clerkship with Chief Judge Barbera during the Court of Appeals’ 2015 term,
but our relationship goes back several years prior. I have the unique privilege
of writing this tribute not just as a former law clerk, but also as a former
student, intern, and, fondly, having her officiate my wedding. And, above
all, I can speak on behalf of all of Chief Judge Barbera’s law clerks in writing
this tribute to her as a lifelong mentee. Chief Judge Barbera has singularly
shaped the trajectory of my career, and those of undoubtedly many others,
and we are all forever indebted to her and eternally grateful for her
mentorship.
I first met Chief Judge Barbera in my second year of law school at the
American University Washington College of Law when I enrolled in the
Criminal Procedure course that she taught alongside her husband, nowretired Judge Gary Bair. Each week, Judge Bair gave the lectures on the
assigned reading and Chief Judge Barbera presided over a mock suppression
hearing based on an assigned prompt in which four students—two in the role
of prosecutor and two as defense attorneys—argued whether certain evidence
obtained by police should be suppressed under the principles discussed in
lecture. Understanding that as a then-Associate Judge on the highest court in
the State of Maryland, any student reasonably would find her intimidating,
she made every effort not to be. I was immediately struck by her
dynamism—she was engaging, enthusiastic, quick-witted, and kept the
students on our toes. Yet she was eminently fair in her questioning and her
constructive critiques of the students’ advocacy and application of the
relevant precedent. Her students learned not only the nuances of the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence, but also the mechanics of how the law was applied in
practice—a lesson that many doctrinal courses neglect to teach.
After completing Chief Judge Barbera’s Criminal Procedure course, I
sought and was fortunate enough to obtain an internship in her chambers that
summer, followed by a clerkship a year after graduation. As expected, Chief
© 2021 Rebecca W. Foreman.
*
Associate at Arent Fox LLP and 2014 graduate of the American University Washington
College of Law.
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Judge Barbera provided me with everything any young lawyer could ask for
in an internship and clerkship. When I was an intern, she gave me the
opportunity to do much more than discrete research projects and
memoranda—as is common for law school interns serving on appellate
courts. My workload and level of responsibility included both advising her
on cases coming before the Court and taking the first pass at an opinion she
was tasked with authoring. As a law clerk, Chief Judge Barbera continually
set high expectations for my writing and critical thinking so that I always had
new goals to surpass. With her high expectations, however, came the
freedom to reach my own conclusions and a genuine respect for my opinion.
Chief Judge Barbera does not hire law clerks to be rubber stamps; she often
sought counsel from her clerks in debating the right outcome of a particular
decision, and on more than one occasion has been swayed from her initial
impression after reading a law clerk’s bench memo or engaging with the clerk
on his or her analysis. In assigning draft opinions to her clerks, she would
instruct us on the mandate and high-level reasoning a majority of the Court
had agreed upon, but she expected us to write the first draft of the opinion
based on our own research and analysis. This responsibility and freedom is
truly invaluable for a young lawyer—to be required to test the arguments
made in briefs submitted to the Court by much more experienced lawyers,
draw our own independent conclusions, and draft an opinion in the voice of
the State’s highest Court fosters a level of confidence and polish that is
essential for a career in which critical thinking and persuasive writing are
crucial components.
While my clerkship with Chief Judge Barbera was instrumental in
honing my analytical and writing skills, foremost were the lessons I learned
from her leading by example. She is a tireless worker—she was almost
always the first one in chambers and the last to leave, unless she had a law
school class to teach, a speaking engagement, or a meeting in Annapolis
during the legislative session. During my summer internship, Chief Judge
Barbera was elevated from Associate Judge to Chief Judge, and she balanced
effortlessly her judicial obligations and the administrative duties required of
the head of the Maryland Judiciary, which required her to wear many hats,
often at the same time or in quick succession. As one example, she made
productive use of her time during her trips from her home base in
Montgomery County to the Court of Appeals building in Annapolis. Her law
clerks would alternate driving with her to Annapolis on oral argument days,
and during those trips she would re-read the briefs that were set for argument
that day, take a call from a member of the legislature about a matter coming
before the General Assembly, or connect with a colleague to persuade him or
her to join her view on a case or discuss an upcoming Rules Committee
meeting. Some of my favorite memories from my clerkship are those rides
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to Annapolis, where I got an inside look at the inner workings of the Judiciary
and how it interacts with the other branches of State government, and to
interact with the Judge on a more personal level. Chief Judge Barbera also
took that opportunity to press us about the bench memos we wrote for that
day’s cases, so we had to be prepared not just to transport this precious cargo
safely to the Court of Appeals, but to do so while giving an impromptu oral
argument on the key facts of those cases and why our analyses and
recommendations were correct.
And no matter the myriad other responsibilities on her plate as judge,
law school lecturer, and head of the Maryland Judiciary, Chief Judge Barbera
paid attention to the smallest details. When working with her on a draft
opinion, we would spend hours debating not just the correct result and
analysis for a particular case, but also proper sentence structure and prose—
to the extent there was any disagreement, we would pour through the Chicago
Manual of Style until we were satisfied that every sentence was constructed
correctly. She was also careful to ensure that her opinions were faithful to
the authorities on which they were based. After a draft opinion was in
essentially final form, the law clerks would gather together to read the draft
word-for-word against the citations to the record and Maryland Reporters, so
that we could confirm that every word of the opinion characterized the record
properly and applied the relevant case law correctly. My co-clerk and I
relished this exercise because we knew that the Court’s published opinion
would be accurate, precise, and without error as a result. Chief Judge
Barbera’s thoughtful and meticulous style taught us the power of our rhetoric,
and that even the smallest details can have a profound impact.
Of course, Chief Judge Barbera is an impeccable writer with keen
intellect, but most of all I admire her for her integrity. In my experience as
her intern and law clerk, she continually managed to strike a balance between
appreciating the broad-ranging impacts the Court’s decisions have on
people’s lives, while eschewing the temptation to issue a ruling solely to
reach a desirable outcome. On many occasions, I witnessed her wrestle with
the weighty decisions the Court had to make, but, in the end, Chief Judge
Barbera always made principled decisions based on what she truly believed
to be consistent with the law.
Notwithstanding all of her professional obligations, Chief Judge
Barbera also takes great interest in her mentees’ lives. I felt such a strong
connection to her even after my brief summer internship that when I got
engaged and was set to be married early into my clerkship a year and a half
later, I could think of no one better to officiate our wedding than Chief Judge
Barbera. As should come as no surprise, she performed her duties brilliantly.
She is every bit as dynamic and engaging an officiant as she is a judge and
teacher. Many wedding guests approached me later to admire her disarming
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and endearing nature, and to express their appreciation that she initiated
conversations and made a genuine effort to get to know them. That anecdote
embodies just who Chief Judge Barbera is as a person—though her charisma
is understated, she is as sincere and radiant as she is brilliant. And though
she is adamant not to take credit for her law clerks’ successes—despite that
we would not have achieved our various accomplishments without her
mentorship—she has always been our biggest fan and cheerleader. Those of
us who were fortunate enough to clerk for Chief Judge Barbera are forever a
part of her family, including our children who become her “grand-clerks.” It
is a family that I am proud and honored to be a part of.
Judge, I speak for all of your former students, interns, and clerks in
thanking you for all you have taught us and the impact you’ve had on our
professional and personal lives. While the bench will not be the same without
you, we know that your work is not completed, and that you will continue to
find avenues to fulfill you and effect positive change on those around you
and the broader legal community. On behalf of all of us, congratulations on
your judicial career and this next chapter.

TRIBUTE TO CHIEF JUDGE MARY ELLEN BARBERA
CHARLES E. MOYLAN, JR. *
Initially, I found it hard to wrap my brain around the harsh reality that
young and vibrant Chief Judge Mary Ellen Barbera had actually reached the
age of mandatory retirement.
As I struggled to comprehend the
incomprehensible, however, a brighter revelation happily dawned. I realized
that I have been lucky enough to have been sitting in the catbird seat, an
observation post from which to have observed at very close hand (and, in
some respects, even to have participated in) the entire professional trajectory
that culminated in the Chief Judgeship. Accordingly, I leave to others any
tribute to Judge Barbera’s eight years as Chief Judge of Maryland or even to
her thirteen-year stint on the Court of Appeals. My alternative salute will be
to the longer thirty-seven-year professional journey that led to the Chief
Judgeship. What were some of the key elements and who were some of the
key players that went into the making of a Chief Judge? What were some of
the key events that presaged later success?
Ironically, the professional journey that ended in Annapolis began in
Annapolis. In September of 1984, I was delighted when my law school
schoolmate, Robert L. Karwacki, who had been the administrative judge for
the Circuit Court of Baltimore City (then still called the Supreme Bench),
joined us on the Court of Special Appeals. What I did not yet fully appreciate
was that he was bringing with him as his first appellate law clerk an eager
and intellectually inquisitive Mel Barbera, fresh out of the University of
Maryland Law School and embarking, as a first-year law clerk, on her first
legal job. If you plan to end up on the Court of Appeals, there is no better
way to prepare than by drafting appellate opinions, although I daresay she
had not planned in that way.
The transformative influence of Judge Karwacki on future Judge
Barbera cannot be over-emphasized. In addition to being a treasure trove of
legal lore and wisdom, Judge Karwacki had a life-long commitment to seek
out and to follow the better angels of the law. In that regard, Mel Barbera
has been a worthy disciple of Judge Bob Karwacki. The influence of the law
clerk’s job was substantive as well. In her companion tribute, my colleague
Judge Deborah Eyler has deftly traced and analyzed Judge Barbera’s impact

© 2021 Charles E. Moylan, Jr.
*
Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals (retired December 14, 2020).
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on the law of Maryland. In all the cases analyzed, I found only a single one
that was not in the area of criminal law or criminal-constitutional procedure.
This, I suggest, was inevitable. Judge Karwacki’s area of special
expertise was criminal-constitutional procedure, as could have been readily
predicted from his pre-judicial life as an assistant attorney general arguing
criminal appeals. The clerkship year of 1984–85, moreover, was one wherein
the entire Court of Special Appeals was itself deeply immersed in criminalconstitutional procedure. In the early life of that Court, “Special Appeals”
essentially meant “Criminal Appeals.” That turbulent time was during the
immediate wake of the Warren Court criminal law revolution. Maryland,
with forty-nine other states, was frantically rushing to conform hundreds of
years of pre-Warren Court practice and procedure to the suddenly imposed
commands of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. Throw in
the Equal Protection Clause for good measure. This was law clerk Barbera’s
intellectual seedbed. These were the seeds that inevitably grew.
A passing word in defense of areas of special expertise. Although
appellate judges are in theory expected to be generalists, the appellate judge
has not yet been born—from Lord Mansfield to John Marshall to Oliver
Wendell Holmes—who did not have, and revel in, a comfortable retreat of
special expertise.
Another significant influence on young Mel Barbera was extended
interaction––over the years and in divergent venues such as law schools, bar
association committee assignments, and the courtroom––with the inimitable
Byron Warnken. Extended interaction with Byron is an education in and of
itself, legal and otherwise. The special area of expertise of Byron, moreover,
was criminal constitutional procedure.
It was only a little more than a year after her clerkship had concluded
that I became personally aware that the fairy dust had, indeed, fallen on Mary
Ellen Barbera, as she rapidly emerged as the star performer and later Deputy
Chief of the Criminal Appeals Division of the Maryland Attorney General’s
Office. Her area of special expertise coincided with my own, as did her
strategic deployment of that expertise. I looked forward to her appearances
before me, knowing that we saw eye to eye. The hot topic of that half-decade
was Batson v. Kentucky 1 and the pandemic racial implications of the
peremptory challenge. Batson v. Kentucky was more than enough to keep
both the Court of Special Appeals and the Criminal Appeals Division fully
employed for three or four seasons, as an infinite variety of possible Batson
applications cried out for prompt resolution. In responding to Batson
particularly, I remember vividly the exhilarating, but scrupulously informal,
collaboration between the opinion writing judge and the assistant attorney
1. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
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general. Sometimes the Court of Appeals agreed with us. Occasionally it
went astray and did not, but the assistant attorney general and I always
agreed. Once again, of course, the focus was on criminal-constitutional
procedure.
It was during those years, moreover, that Mary Ellen Barbera first
became a member of the Maryland State Bar Association’s Committee on
Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal (“Irma’s Committee”). The focus was,
by definition, on criminal law and criminal-constitutional procedure. The
business meetings were intellectually heavy, but the dinners that followed
were more convivial. They provided the golden opportunity for the new and
young lawyers to “join the club”—to get to know on an easy and casual basis
Irma, Andy, Debby, Howard, Byron, and countless others. This, of course,
is an indispensable stage of the maturing process. King’s Contrivance and
Chiapparelli’s are meaningful rungs on the professional ladder.
Of all of the transformative influences that coalesced to mold the
inquisitive young law clerk into the chief judicial officer in the state, the most
catalytic without peer has been that of her husband, Judge Gary E. Bair. Gary
had been the Chief of the Criminal Appeals Division when Mary Ellen was
Deputy Chief. After a stellar career, he recently retired from the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County. It has been the good fortune of bench and bar that
the partnership between Mary Ellen and Gary has been not simply marital
but also professorial. At Maryland and District of Columbia law schools,
especially at American University, they have combined to teach senior
seminars. They have been equally generous with their teaching skills at
numerous judicial classes staged by the Maryland Judicial Institute. In a
number of lecturing gigs myself, I was fortunate to have performed with
Mary Ellen and Gary or under their aegis. For year after year, Judge Barbera
and Judge Bair, Mel and Gary, have been a perfect teaching team. It goes
without saying that their subject was criminal-constitutional law. After
joining the Court of Appeals, Judge Barbera served for five years as the Chair
of the Board of Directors of the Judicial Institute of Maryland.
The legal world has not adequately noted the fruitful correlation
between judging and teaching. For some judges, opinion writing is a
modality of teaching.
The opinion writer is sometimes praised,
undeservedly, for a felicitous turn of phrase or for the perfect bon mot as if
that felicitous phrasing or the bon mot had been a burst of sudden inspiration.
The opinion writer’s well-kept secret is that the felicitous phrasing and the
precise word selection may have been nothing more than the inevitable end
product of repeated honing, trimming, and polishing semester after semester
in the classroom. Effective expression sometimes needs a chance to
marinate. As William Butler Yeats incisively described the craft of writing,
“A line will take us hours maybe; Yet if it does not seem a moment’s thought,
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Our stitching and unstitching has been naught.” 2 Judging and teaching are
by no means divergent disciplines. The classroom and the lecture hall are
simply Off Broadway. Some of the Chief Judge’s opinions, therefore, may
have sounded eerily familiar to her former students. Such is the synergetic
cross-fertilization between the classroom and the courtroom. Before and
while attending law school at night, incidentally, Mel Barbera had taught for
nine years in the public school system of Baltimore City. Even years later,
the fingerprints of a born teacher are indelible.
I had been saddened several years earlier when Mel Barbera left the
Criminal Appeals Division for several years to take up other legal duties,
because it aborted the plans we had tentatively been making to write a book
together on the Criminal Law of Maryland. I was conversely overjoyed,
therefore, on January 4, 2002, when she was sworn in as a member of the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals. She was appointed, incidentally, to the
very seat that I had recently vacated. I lingered on the Court as a Senior
Judge, so Judge Barbera and I were colleagues on that Court for almost seven
years.
From the outset, the tone and tenor of her opinions was inspirational.
Those opinions did not merely explain the Court’s decision, as important as
that function may be. On what some of us consider to be a higher plane of
opinion writing, they contributed to the incremental building and the
concomitant teaching of the ever-growing common law of Maryland. Early
in the twelfth century, a philosopher walked out onto the square of a
provincial French town. Two workmen sat on the ground, each with a chisel
in hand and each before a large block of stone. The foundations were being
laid for Chartres Cathedral. The philosopher approached the first workman,
“My good man, what are you doing?” He received the standard reply, “I’m
chipping stone.” The philosopher turned to the second workman, “And my
good man, what are you doing?” The response reverberates to this day, “I
am building a cathedral.” As she broke from the starting gate, Judge Barbera
knew that she was building a cathedral. Sir Frederick Pollock once expressed
his reverence for such contributing to the building of the common law, “So
magnificent is this living temple of justice, this immemorial yet freshly
growing fabric of the common law, that the least of us will be happy hereafter
if he can look back upon a single stone thereof and say, ‘Yea, the work of my
hands is there.’”
It was with the mixed emotion of pride and regret that I looked upon the
period of December 2007 through September of 2008. It was within that
nine-month span that the Court of Appeals cannibalized the Court of Special

2. WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS, Adam’s Curse, in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF WILLIAM
BUTLER YEATS 72 (1908).
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Appeals by elevating, seemingly with one fell swoop, Mary Ellen Barbera,
Sally Adkins, and Joe Murphy. We promptly enlisted Shirley Watts and
Michele Hotten just to protect ourselves from further raiding. On the Court
of Appeals there then proceeded to effervesce in Judge Barbera’s opinions
the seeds that had once been sown in the appellate briefs of the assistant
attorney general. The dominant message remained in the language of
criminal-constitutional law.
The final rung up the ladder for the promising young law clerk of 1984
was into the center chair on July 8, 2013. What does it mean when an
associate judge becomes a chief judge? It means, inter alia, that an avalanche
of administrative responsibilities will be piled onto an undiminished
adjudicative load. Bench and bar alike, however, were electrified by Chief
Judge Barbera’s first and immediate administrative triumph, that of making
the trains run on time––the prompt filing of appellate opinions within
established filing deadlines.
At the apex of the entire judicial branch of government, the importance
of the ceremonial role of the position of Chief Judge of the entire state cannot
for a moment be overemphasized. One is not simply presiding over a
collegial gathering of seven essentially like-minded people. That might have
been true one hundred years ago. It no longer is. One is presiding over a vast
administrative apparatus that reaches into every far-flung corner of the state
from Deep Creek Lake to Assateague. The Chief Judge, of course, is the
voice for over 300 judges and the 4,000 employees of the judicial branch,
before the Governor, the General Assembly, the press, and the public. It is
almost incomprehensible how one person, between arguing over the
subtleties of a police interrogation technique and delving into the nuances of
double jeopardy, can suddenly put those problems aside to determine how
the entire state judiciary will respond to an international pandemic. Between
the national demands of boards and meetings and seminars, on the one hand,
and the compelling local demands of weddings and funerals and mandatory
celebrations, on the other hand, how does one even pick up an appellate brief?
Could young Mel Barbera have remotely anticipated any of this when she
signed on as Bob Karwacki’s first appellate law clerk? As the public voice
of the Maryland judiciary, however, Chief Judge Barbera has staged a
virtuosa performance. Bravo!
I have saved for the last an aspect of the education of the future Chief
Judge that could too easily have been overlooked. In bits and pieces over the
years, I have come to realize that Judge Barbera is, as am I, an inveterate old
movie buff. For such old movie buffs, of course, our Valhalla is the Golden
Age of Hollywood, from Gary Cooper to “Mrs. Miniver” and from Paul
Newman to “All About Eve.” Although parents and elders may have rued
the so-called wasted hours spent “at the movies,” many of those movies
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constitute the great storehouse of Western thought and culture from which
judicial opinions are merely emanations. Unfortunately, the official
transcript fails to record the hours upon hours of graduate credit once earned
at the Ideal or at the Hampden (with its Gottfried Organ) on 36th Street.
What a blinding epiphany it would have been if we could have looked
in on a fifth-grade classroom at St. Thomas Aquinas Elementary School on
Hickory Avenue at 37th Street sixty years ago and have seen a ten-year-old
girl sitting in that classroom, the DNA of the future chief judicial officer of
the state. From my catbird seat, I have witnessed an incredible thirty-sevenyear journey. What words then are appropriate to pay tribute to such a
rainbow arc trajectory? What words are appropriate to toast in a single breath
both the duly honored Chief Judge who now stands at the far end of that
rainbow bridge but also the inquisitive law clerk who once stood at the near
end? I must try. As one old movie buff to another, let me raise a glass of
Dom Perignon and salute the retiring Chief Judge and the aspiring law clerk
alike with the inimitable words of Richard Blaine (Rick, of course, of Rick’s
Cafe), “Here’s looking at you, Kid.” 3

3. CASABLANCA (Warner Bros. 1943).

